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Abstract 
A well-known result (Leivant, 1983) states that, over basic Kalmar elementary arithmetic 
EA. the induction schema for Z” formulas is equivalent to the uniform reflection principle for 
Z ,,_I formulas (n> I). We show that fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by various forms of 
induction rules admit a precise axiomatization in terms of reflection principles as well. Thus, 
the closure of EA under the induction rule for 1” (or H,+I ) formulas is equivalent to 01 times 
iterated Z” reflection principle. Moreover, for k < w, k times iterated C reflection principle over 
EA precisely corresponds to the extension of EA by <k nested applications of Z” induction 
rule. 
The above relationship holds in greater generality than just stated. In fact, we give general 
formulas characterizing in terms of iterated reflection principles the extension of any given theory 
(containing EA) by <k nested applications of Z” or fl, induction rules. In particular, the closure 
of a theory T under just one application of Zi induction rule is equivalent to T together with 
& reflection principle for each finite I72 axiomatized subtheory of T. 
These results have closely parallel ones in the theory of subrecursive function classes. The 
rules under study correspond, in a canonical way, to natural closure operators on the classes 
of provably recursive functions. Thus, ZI induction rule precisely corresponds to the primitive 
recursive closure operator, and & collection rule, introduced below, corresponds to the elementary 
closure operator. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that first-order theories can be defined, over first-order logic, by 
sets of axioms as well as by sets of rules. An axiom can be viewed as a particular 
kind of rule with an empty, or with some fixed, provable premise. Vice versa, for a 
theory T axiomatized by rules, all theorems of T constitute a trivial axiomatization 
of T by a set of axioms. So, if one identifies a theory with its set of theorems - a 
point of view especially supported by the model-theoretic tradition in logic - there is 
no essential difference between rules and axioms. 
This paper is devoted to a detailed proof-theoretic analysis of restricted induction 
rules in arithmetic. Our main results characterize closures of arithmetical theories con- 
taining EA by induction rules in terms of axioms. In contrast with the above observa- 
tion, we are looking for natural and informative axiomatizations, rather than for easy 
but useless ones. 
One difficulty in the way of this project lies in the fact that, in general, the closure 
of a theory T under a given inference rule R not only depends on R, but on also on T. 
So, a meaningful characterization of a rule must somehow take into account arbitrary 
theories T (of a given class). This feature requires a somewhat sharper analysis of 
induction rules than those existing in the proof-theoretic literature [ 10, 11, 17, 181, 
for in all these works the authors dealt with the closures under the induction rules of 
particular base theories, such as EA or PRA. 
Our axiomatizations are formulated in terms of iterated rejection principles; see 
[20, 141. Very roughly, k times iterated reflection principle of relevant arithmetical 
complexity happens to be the strongest formula that can be inferred from a given finite 
theory (of relevant complexity) using <k nested applications of the induction rule in 
question. In this sense, our axiomatizations are canonical. In particular, this also allows 
for general characterizations of the closures of arbitrary extensions of EA under the 
restricted induction rules. 
Our characterizations are informative in the sense that they yield several interest- 
ing corollaries concerning finite (non)axiomatizability of theories given by induction 
rules, give wide sufficient conditions for the equivalence of (closures of theories by) 
n n+i and C,, induction rules, and allow us to give new proofs of several old results, 
such as the conservativity results for induction schemata over induction rules, charac- 
terizations of provably total recursive functions of theories axiomatized by rules, and 
others. 
The rules studied in this paper correspond to natural closure operators on the classes 
of provably recursive functions of theories, e.g., Ci induction rule precisely corresponds 
to the primitive recursive closure operator. We also introduce and study a natural 
version of Ci collection rule, which corresponds to the elementary closure operator. 
This rule is especially useful for the analysis of theories, whose classes of provably 
recursive functions are not elementarily closed. The role of reflection principles in 
connection with the rules is similar to the role of universal functions for subrecursive 
classes w.r.t. the above-mentioned closure operators. 
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For further discussion we must fix some terminology and formulate a few back- 
ground results. 
Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA is a theory known in several equivalent formu- 
lations. When formulated in the standard language of Peano arithmetic PA it has the 
name Ido + EXP and is axiomatized by restricting, in the standard formulation of PA, 
the schema of induction 
A(0) A Vx(A(x) + A(x + 1)) + VxA(x) (1) 
to bounded formulas A(x) and by adding a I& axiom stating that the function 2x is 
total. It is well-known that I& + EXP is a finitely axiomatizable theory [4]. 
In an alternative formulation, the language of EA contains function symbols for all 
Kalmar elementary functions, and mathematical axioms of EA are (1) (open) defining 
equations for all these functions; and (2) the schema of induction for open formulas. 
It is known that EA admits a purely universal (or quantifier free) axiomatization in 
this language. The two formulations of EA are equivalent in the sense that the second 
theory can be viewed as a conservative ‘definitional extension’ of the first one. 
Let us also mention the fact that there exists a finite, purely universal formulation 
of EA in a language with symbols for jnitely many elementary functions. This fact 
is closely related to a well-known theorem, originally due to Rodding, stating that the 
class of Kalmar elementary functions has a finite basis under composition (see, e.g., 
[7, 91). We shall sketch a proof of this useful fact, as well as that of the finite basis 
theorem, in Section 4. 
Our results are invariant w.r.t. the choice of the language of EA, but not all of 
their proofs are. For definiteness (unless the opposite is obvious from the context) we 
assume that EA is formulated in the language of PA. It is known that EA is strong 
enough to reasonably formalize syntax, provability, Godel’s incompleteness theorems 
and partial truth definitions (see [4]). All theories considered below are assumed to 
contain EA. By an arithmetical theory we mean a theory formulated in the language of 
EA. Classes of arithmetical C, and II, formulas are defined in the usual way (cf. p. 13, 
[4]). They are invariant w.r.t. the choice of the language of EA (modulo EA-provable 
equivalence). 
C. Parsons was probably the first to systematically study fragments of PA obtained 
by restricting various forms of induction to classes of the arithmetic hierarchy. In [lo, 
111, among other things, he showed that, over EA, the induction schema (1) for C, 
formulas A(x), denoted C,-IA, is strictly stronger than the corresponding induction rule 
for C, formulas, C,-IR (n > 1): 
A(O), ‘v’x(A(x) + A(x + 1)) 1 VxA(x). 
Parsons demonstrated that many other natural forms of restricted induction over EA 
are equivalent to one of these two. In particular, 
EA + C,-IA = EA + U,-IA (2) 
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(this theory is also often denoted I&) and 
E/I + C,-IR = EA + II,,+,-IR. (3) 
Here the expression T = U means that the theories T and U are deductively equivalent, 
i.e., have the same set of theorems. 
Despite the two results looking very similar, they are rather different in nature, as 
the reader familiar with their proofs undoubtedly feels. Equivalence (2) actually holds 
over any theory T containing EA, and this indicates a really tight relationship between 
the two axiom schemata. On the other hand, it is well-known that equivalence (3) may 
cease to be true for some theories stronger than EA. For example, 
I& + C,-IR = ZC, $ ZC, + U2-IR, 
because 1Zi + I’I2-IR proves the consistency of I&, e.g., by our results in Section 3. 
This shows that, from some sharper point of view, Zi-IR and n2-IR are substantially 
difSerent rules. In order to accurately formulate this point of view we adopt a few 
rather general definitions. 
Since the rules we deal with in this paper typically apply to any one from an infinite 
collection of premises, we say that a rule is a set of instances, that is, expressions of 
the form 
A,,...+% 
B ’ 
where Al,..., A, and B are formulas. Derivations using rules are defined in the standard 
way; T + R denotes the closure of a theory T under a rule R and first-order logic. 
[T, R] denotes the closure of T under unnested applications of R, that is, the theory 
axiomatized over T by all formulas B such that, for some formulas Al,. . . , A, derivable 
in T, (Al,..., A,)/B is an instance of R. 
Definition 1. Let R1 and Rz be rules. RI is reducible to R2 (denoted R1 <R2) iff, for 
every theory T containing EA, [T,Rl] c[T,Rz]. RI and R2 are congruent (RI 2 R2) iff 
RI <R2 and Rz<Rl. 
Informally, R1 bR2 means that an arbitrary application of RI can be modeled over 
EA by unnested applications of R2. Notice that < is reflexive and transitive, so that 
GZ is an equivalence relation. For the purposes of this paper we may safely identify 
congruent rules. 
We say that a rule R is congruent to a set of axioms U, iff R is congruent to U 
considered as a trivial schematic rule (with the empty premise), or equivalently, iff 
[T, R] = T + U for any theory T extending EA. Notice that rules congruent to axiom 
schemata have a trivial behaviour in the sense that they cannot be applied fruitfully 
more than once: nested applications of such rules do not yield new theorems. 
Definition 2. RI is derivable from R2 (denoted Rl<Rz), iff for every theory T con- 
taining EA, T+RlCT+Rz. 
L. D. Beklemishev I Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 85 (1997) 193-242 197 
In other words, RI $Rz iff for any application (A,, . . . , A,)/B of RI there exists a 
derivation of B from Al, . . . ,A, using EA and rule R2. Clearly, RI dR2 implies RI 4R2 
but not necessarily vice versa. Below we shall see that equivalences of rules established 
by purely elementary methods can usually be strengthened to congruences. On the other 
hand, equivalence proofs involving more sophisticated methods usually depend on the 
choice of a particular base theory and therefore do not yield reducibilities either in the 
sense of Definition 1 or 2. 
Example. We have seen that fi2-IR+Ci-IR, although the closure of EA under each 
of these rules is the same. On the other hand, obviously Ci-IR<n2-IR. Corollary 2.2 
in Section 2 shows that II,-IR< C,-IR, for IZ > 1, but not vice versa. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we classify various forms of 
induction rules modulo congruence relation. We shall show that these rules, most 
commonly, fall into one of the three distinct categories: (a) rules congruent to in- 
duction axiom schemata; (b) rules congruent to C, induction rule C,-IR; (c) rules 
congruent to Ii’, induction rule U,-IR. (An interesting candidate for falling out of 
this classification is the induction rule for boolean combinations of C,, formulas, 
which is derivable from, but possibly not reducible to, Z,,-IR for n > 1; see 
Section 10. ) 
The question of the axiomatizability of rules of category (a) is trivially settled. So, 
in the remaining part of the paper we analyze the other two cases. In Section 3 we 
introduce reflection principles and characterize 17,-IR for IZ 2 1. A similar characteri- 
zation of C,-IR is more difficult and is given in Section 7 for Ci-IR, and in Section 9 
for C,,-IR, n > 1. The characterization of Ci-IR requires a rather careful analysis of 
provably recursive functions of theories axiomatized by this rule. In Section 4 we recall 
basic facts about provably recursive functions and formulate an easy characterization 
of these functions for closures of II2 axiomatized theories by Ci-IR. In Section 5 we 
analyze the question, when the class of provably recursive functions of a theory is ele- 
mentarily closed. A natural sufficient condition is formulated in terms of Ci collection 
rule. In Section 6, on the basis of these results, we construct a suitable universal func- 
tion for the class of provably recursive functions of a finite II2 axiomatized extension 
of EA using only unnested applications of Ci-IR over that theory. This allows us to 
obtain in Section 7 the required characterization of Ci-IR, and subsequently relativize 
it to .E,-IR for n > 1. 
It should be said that in the proof of our main results we did not try to be overly 
laconic. We have included proofs of several results which were formally never used in 
the main proofs, like a theorem of R. Peter on nested recursion, or the results the use of 
which could be avoided, like the finite basis theorem for Kalmar elementary functions. 
It seems to us that proofs of these easy facts (modulo the rest of our techniques) would 
enhance the reader’s general understanding of peculiar phenomena treated in this paper, 
so we decided to include them. The results of Section 3 of this paper have been earlier 
announced in [ 11. 
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2. Basic equivalences 
C. Parsons showed that many natural forms of induction (of restricted arithmetical 
complexity) over ,!?A are equivalent to either C,-IR or C,-IA. In this section we obtain 
a few more results of this kind. We classify various forms of induction rules modulo 
the sharper congruence relation. Some of Parsons’ equivalences then turn out to be 
congruences, whereas some others do not. We also examine a few rules that have not 
been considered by Parsons. In addition to IR we consider the following forms of 
induction rule: 
IR,, : t’x (A(x) + ,4(x + 1)) t A(0) + Vx A(x) 
IR, : Vx (Vy <x A(y) + A(x)) t- Vx A(x) 
LR : 3x A(x) t- 3x (A(x) A VJY <x d(y)) 
As usual, for r a class of arithmetical formulas, r-I&, T-IR<, and T-LR will denote 
the above rules with the restriction that A t r. We also assume that formulas A(x) may 
contain free parameters other than x. Everywhere below, whenever we talk about C,, 
or U, induction rules or axioms, it will be implicitly assumed that n b 1. 
Proposition 2.1. C,,-IRO S n,-IR, g C,-IR. 
Proof. (1) The congruence Z,-I& 2 ZI,-I& is proved in analogy with the proof of the 
equivalence of C,-IA and I?,-IA (cf. [ 111). For example, to show that C,-I& < ZI,-I&, 
consider a formula A(x) E C,, such that 
I- k Vx (A(x) + A(x + 1)). 
Then for B(a,x) := 1A(alx) one has 
T k Vx (B(a,x) -+ B(a,x + l)), 
whence 
[T, ZI,-I&] F B(a, 0) --+ Vx B(u,x) 
t- B(u, 0) --f B(u, a) 
t A(0) + A(u). 
Notice that a similar trick does not work with the rule IR. 
(2) Obviously, Z,-IR<C,-IRs, so we only have to show that Zn-IRc QC,-IR. Let 
ClyA(y,x)~C, with A(y,x)E&l, and let 
T t ‘ix (3yA(y,x) -+ 3yA(y,x + 1)). 
Then we have 
T k \Jx @Y (A(a,O) -+ A(Y,x)) -j 3y (A(a,O) -+ A(y,x + 1))) 
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and obviously 
T k 3Y (A(a,O) --+ A(Y,O)). 
It follows that 
k 3uA(u,O) -+ vx3y A(y,x). 0 
Corollary 2.2. I;I,-IR 6 C,-IR, Z,-IR#n,-IR 
Proof. First, ZI,-IR < n,-&, and by Proposition 2.1 Un-IR.a d C,-IR. 
Second, it is easily seen (and was noticed by Parsons) that &I + Ck+t -1R contains 
ZCk. On the other hand, by a theorem of Leivant [6] on the optimal complexity of 
axiomatization of induction, EA + Ilk+ I- IR, being an extension of EA by a set of true 
IIk+i sentences, cannot contain Z.Zk. This shows our claim for n > 1. For n = 1 we 
notice that, e.g., by Theorem 2 proved in Section 7, [EA, Cl-IR] contains the uniform 
Z, reflection principle for EA (this fact can also be inferred from some results in [21]). 
This means that [EA, Ci-IR] is not contained in any consistent set of 171 sentences over 
EA, in particular, not in EA + ni-IR. 0 
Proposition 2.3. ZI,-IR, ?Z I?,-IR, C,-IR, 2 C,-IR 
Proof. The only nontrivial reduction is Z,-IR, 6 C,-IR. (Notice that, if A(x) E C,, the 
formula Vy <x A(y) need not be equivalent to a &-formula in absence of Z,-collection 
principle, and so the obvious argument does not work.) 
Suppose 
T E Vx (Vy < x A(y) + A(x)), (4) 
where A(x) := 3~ Ag(x, u), Ag(x, u) E II,_, . Define 
B(x) := 3zVy bx A&, (z)~). 
Here (z)~ denotes the yth element of a sequence coded by z, the standard coding 
function being Kalmar elementary. Clearly, B(x) E C,, and from (4) one readily obtains 
T k B(0) A Vx (B(x) + B(x + 1)). 
Applying Z,-IR once, we get Vx B(x) and Vxk3y Ag(x, u). 0 
Now we examine some rules congruent to axiom schemata. The effect of such rules 
over a theory T is precisely that of adding to T a fixed amount of axioms (that do 
not depend on T). This idea is spelled out in the following definition. 
Definition 3. A rule R is congruent to a set of formulas U (denoted R ” Cl) iff, for 
every theory T containing EA, [T, R] = T + U. 
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It is not difficult to see that, if R 2 U, then we have 
[[T,R],R] = [T,R] + U = (T + U) + U = T + U = [T,R], 
and so, such a rule can nontrivially be applied only once. Also notice that in order to 
demonstrate R ” U it is enough to check that [EA, R] contains U and that T + U is 
closed under R for every theory T. 
Of the rules congruent to axiom schemes the most obvious one is the usual Gentzen- 
style rule of induction, which can also be called ‘the induction rule with side formulas’. 
In Hilbert-style formulation it may look, e.g., as follows: 
B--tb’x(A(x)+A(x+ 1)) 
B + (A(0) -+ VxA(x)) ’ 
It is well-known that, whenever the complexity of the formula A is restricted to, say, 
C,, this rule provides an alternative axiomatization of I& (over EA). Moreover, the 
reader may easily check that to derive an instance of C,-IA only one application of 
the rule is necessary. On the other hand, the fact that T + C,-IA is closed under the 
induction rule with side formulas is obvious, hence the rule is congruent to C,-IA. Of 
course, such an effect is only possible because no restriction was imposed on the arith- 
metical complexity of the ‘side formula’ B. Our further examples are of a somewhat 
more delicate nature. 
Recall that, for a class of arithmetical formulas r, da(r)-formulas are those ob- 
tained from r by means of boolean connectives and bounded quantifiers. Parsons [ 1 l] 
essentially proved the following fact. 
Proposition 2.4. da(&)-IR 2 C,-IA. 
Proof. To derive an instance of C,-IA apply IR to the following da(&) formula: 
A(0) A Vx < a (A(x) -+ A(x + 1)) + Vx<a A(x), 
where A(x) E C,. 
(5) 
To show that T + Z,-IA is closed under do(&)-IR for each theory T notice that 
an even stronger fact is known: I& contains &(&)-IA (cf. [l l] or [4, Lemma 2.14, 
p. 651). 0 
The above proposition has a somewhat paradoxical consequence that Ao(.& )-IR turns 
out to be actually stronger than fl2-IR over EA. This looks strange because we all are 
used to the fact that in the standard model of arithmetic da(&) sets are 42 and hence 
strictly lower in the hierarchy than II2 sets. No contradiction in mathematics arises 
from this because EA is a weak enough theory to think (or rather, not to exclude) that 
Ao(C, ) sets can be very complex. In fact, Proposition 2.4 provides a relevant instance 
of Zt-IA of the form (5) as an example to this effect. Now we are ready to examine 
the least element rule LR. 
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Proposition 2.5. &LR E &(C,,)-LR E C,-LR 
Proof. (1) The first congruence is proved very similarly to the quoted Lemma 2.14 
of [4]. We only sketch the argument. 
For a formula A(Z) := A(xi , . . . ,xk) let ‘q is a z-piece of A’ denote the following 
formula: 
‘q codes a function [O;zlk + (0, 1)’ A Vxi,. . . ,& <z (A(.?) ++ ‘q(Z) = 1’). 
We say that A is piecewise coded in a theory T iff 
T F Vz3q ‘q is a z-piece of A’. 
It is readily seen that the class of formulas piecewise coded in a theory T containing 
EA is closed under boolean connectives and bounded quantifiers. 
Now we show that the theory [EA,&-LR] piecewise encodes all C,-formulas. In- 
deed, for any such formula A(,?) we obviously have 
EA t- 3q (q : [O;alk + (0, 1) A ‘d.?<a (A(2) -+ q(Z) = l)), 
because, e.g., one may take for q the function identically equal to 1. Applying II,-LR 
once we get the minimal such q. It faithfully encodes the a-piece of A because the 
standard coding of finite functions has the property that functions with smaller values 
are assigned smaller codes. It follows that all C,, and hence all As(&), formulas are 
piecewise coded in [EA, &-LR]. 
Now it is easy to derive da(&)-LR. Let EA t- 3x A(x), where A(x)E&(&). Then 
we have 
[EA, ZI,-LR] t- 3x,q (A(x) A ‘q is a x-piece of A’). 
For this q, using only elementary induction we can find the minimal x such that 
q(x)= 1. It coincides with the least x such that A(x) holds since q is the x-piece of A. 
(2) To demonstrate the second congruence it is sufficient to show that every Z7, 
formula is piecewise coded in [EA, &LR]. Let VuAg(u,x) be such a formula, with 
A0 E Zn_ 1. Following the same idea as before, and taking for q the function identically 
equal to 1, we obtain 
EA t- 3q 3u b’x’xba (Ao((uh,x) + q(x) = 1). 
Using C,,-LR take the least such q (and a corresponding u). In order to see that q is 
as required reason, for any x <a, as follows: 
l If ‘v’zAo(z,x), then Ao((uX,x) and hence q(x) = 1. 
l If lzlAo(z,x) and q(x) = 1, pick any such z and define a sequence u’ and a function 
q’ as follows: (u’)i = (u)i, for i #x, (u’)~ = Z; and q’(i) = q(i), for i # x, q’(x) = 0. 
Then q’ has a smaller code than q and satisfies 
Vi<a (A~((u’)~,i) --+ q’(i) = l), 
which contradicts the minimality of q. 0 
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Proposition 2.6. II,-LR 2 Z,,-LR E &IA. 
Proof. It is well-known that &-IA is equivalent to the least number principle for 
do(&) formulas (cf. [4]), hence T + &IA is closed under do(&)-LR for any theory 
T. Now we derive the least number principle for an arbitrary do(&) formula A(x). 
Obviously, 
EA t- 3x (A(a) + A(x)). 
Using Proposition 2.5 we conclude that [EA,&LR] contains 
3x ((A(a) --+ A(x)) A VY <x %4(a) + A(Y))), 
This formula implies 
3x (A(u) --f (4x1 A VY <x 14~))) 
and 
3zA(z) -+ 3x (A(x) A Vy <x yA(y)). 0 
In view of Proposition 2.4 it is natural to ask, what is the strength of the induction 
rule for boolean combinations of C, formulas, a(&)-IR. A priori, we can only say that 
C,-IR< B(C,)-IR< do(&)-IR, 
and that at least one of the two inequalities is strict. In the preliminary version of 
this paper [2] we gave an elementary, although somewhat lengthy, argument showing 
that W(C,)-IR is derivable from C,-IR. This result can be simplified and somewhat 
strengthened using more advanced methods. In particular, now we are able to show that 
93(Ci )-IR and Zi-IR are congruent, although it remains open whether this holds for 
n > 1. We shall treat &?(Ci )-IR more carefully in Section 10 at the end of the paper. 
We summarize the structure of induction rules modulo reducibility (and derivability) 
relation in the following diagram. 
II,-IR IZ,-IR 
Z,-IA E d&C,)-IR c,-IA E A@,)-IR 
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In addition to the already established facts, we remark that neither of the rules 
n n+i-IR and C,-IA is derivable from the other, so that all the reducibilities shown on 
the diagram are proper. Indeed, over EA Z,-IA is strictly stronger than II,+,-IR (see 
the proof of Corollary 2.2) whereas over I&, the latter is stronger than the former, 
e.g., by Theorem 1 formulated in the next section. 
3. ZI,, induction rule 
In this section we give a characterization of 17,-IR in terms of iterated reflection 
principles. 
Rejection principles, for an r.e. theory T, are formal schemata expressing the sound- 
ness of T, that is, the statement that ‘every sentence provable in T is true’. More 
precisely, if Provr(x) denotes a canonical Zi provability predicate for T, then the 
(uniform) reflection principle for T is the schema 
KY (Provr( ‘A(i)‘) - A(x)) 
for all formulas A(x). This schema is denoted RFN(T). Partial reflection principles are 
obtained from it by imposing a restriction that the formula A may only range over a 
certain subclass r of the class of T-formulas. Such schemata will be denoted RFNr( T), 
and for r one usually takes one of the classes C,, or II,, of the arithmetical hierar- 
chy. The following two basic facts on uniform reflection principles are well-known 
(cf. [20]) and easy: 
(1) RFNr,,( T) is equivalent to RFNn,,+,( T) over EA, for n 2 1. RFNn, (T) is equiv- 
alent to Con(T), the consistency assertion for T. 
(2) The schema RFNn,,(T) is equivalent to a single II,, sentence (over EA). This 
follows from the existence of partial truthdefinitions. 
An old and well-known result of Kreisel and Levy [5] says that an alternative 
axiomatization of Peano Arithmetic over EA can be obtained by replacing the induction 
schema by the full uniform reflection principle for EA: 
PA = EA + RFN(EA). 
Leivant sharpened this result by showing that the hierarchies of restricted induction 
schemata and restricted reflection principles over EA actually coincide: 
ZZ, = EA + RFNz,,,, (EA). 
Here we establish a precise relationship between the II, induction rule and certain 
levels of the hierarchy of iterated reflection principles. 
Ida + SUPEXP is the extension of EA by a 17, axiom asserting the totality of 
superexponentiation function 2: (cf. [4]). A theory T is II, axiomatized, if all of its 
nonlogical axioms are II, sentences. 
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Theorem 1. Let T be an arithmetical theory containing EA. Then, for any n 22, 
[T, n,,-IR] is equivalent to T together with RFNn,,(To) for all finite IT,,+1 axiomatized 
subtheories TO of T. This statement also holds for n = 1, provided T contains Ido + 
SUPEXP. 
Our proof of Theorem 1 is based upon quite standard techniques that combine 
Tarski’s method of partial truthdefinitions with the formalization of the cut-elimination 
Theorem, and is, in fact, very close to the proof of Leivant’s theorem (cf. [6]). The 
proof admits an easy direct argument, without any use of skolemization. Working in 
the language of PA, we need a few standard prerequisites. 
Sequent calculus: We adopt a variant of the sequent calculus from [16], i.e., se- 
quents are sets of formulas understood as big disjunctions, negations are treated via 
de Morgan’s laws, etc. Unlike in [16], it will be technically convenient for us to only 
have logical axioms of the form A, 4,74, for atomic formulas (p. It is well-known that 
the modified calculus is equivalent to the original one, also w.r.t. cut-free provability. 
Partial truth definitions: There is a II,, formula Truen,j(x), which adequately ex- 
presses the predicate ‘x is a Godel number of a true n, sentence’ in EA. 2 This means 
that Truen,,(x) is well defined on atomic formulas and provably in EA commutes with 
boolean connectives and quantifiers, i.e., satisfies Tarski conditions for II,, formulas. 
As a result, for any A(x) E l&, we have 
EA I- ‘dx (A(x) ++ Truen,,(‘A(i)l)). (6) 
For our proof it will be essential that Tarski conditions not only hold locally, for each 
individual n, formula, but also uniformly. In other words, EA proves that, for all 
$,$, 0, a,y such that c#I,-~$, $, CI,‘dxy(x), 3xa(x) are II, sentences, 
Truen,,(rO A $l) tf Truen,,(‘Ql) A Truen,,(rII/l), 
Truen,,(‘B V $l) H Truen,2(rB1) V Truen,>(‘II/l), 
Truen,,(r3xa(x)1) ++ 3xTruen,,(rcr(x)1), 
Truen,,(rVxy(x)l) c) VxTruea,( ‘y(x)‘). 
Let us stress that 4, Ic/, . . . here are variables over Giidel numbers of sentences, rather 
than individual sentences. (The standard dots-and-comers notation is somewhat sloppy 
in this respect. Yet, we hope that this will not create serious problems for the reader.) 
On a par with the definition of truth, we also have a reasonable evaluation of terms in 
EA, that is, a definable Kalmar elementary function eval(u,x) which provably commutes 
with 0,‘) +, . and therefore, for any term t(xo,. . . ,x,,), satisfies 
EA I- eval( rtl, (x0,. . . ,x,) ) = t(xo, . . . ,xn). 
’ We assume in this section that the class of II, formulas contains not only those literally in Il, form, but 
also the ones obtained from prenex l7, formulas using V,A, and universal quantification. 
L.D. Beklemishevl Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 85 (1997) 193-242 205 
Usually, eval(u,x) is explicitly used in the construction of a truthdefinition for the 
evaluation of atomic formulas. This implies that the truthdefinition and the evaluation 
of terms agree in the sense that EA proves that for all l7, formulas @(xg, . . _ ,x,) and 
terms to(x), . . . , t,(x), 
E eval(‘til, (x)) = yj -+ 
i=o 
(7) 
(Truea,(r4(t&), . . . , h(~))l) H Tnm,,(r#(.Go,. . . , .i~,,,)~)), 
and similarly for terms ti in more than one free variable. We refer the reader to [4] 
for an elaboration of all the above claims. 
Proof of Theorem 1. [7’, ZZ,-IR] is the theory axiomatized over T by all formulas 
VxZ(x) such that Z(x) E ZZ,, and T proves 
Z(0) A Vx (Z(x) + Z(x + 1)). (8) 
Therefore, first we must show that, for any such Z(x), there is a finite &+I axiomatized 
subtheory TO 5 T such that 
T + FWNn,,(To) k b’xZ(x). 
For the axioms of TO we simply take the ZZ,+i formula (8) together with all axioms 
of EA. Obviously, for every n we have TO k Z(n). Furthermore, formalizing this fact 
in EA we obtain 
EA k Vx Provr,( ‘Z(i)‘). 
This implies VxZ(x) by To-reflection. 
Now we must show that 
K n,-IRl k RWz,,(To) 
for any finite ZZ,+r axiomatized subtheory TO C T. Without loss of generality, we may 
assume that T itself is a finite ZZ,+t axiomatized extension of EA. Furthermore, we may 
assume that the single nonlogical axiom of T has the form Vxc . . . Vxmx(xo,. . . , 
x,,,), where c( is a ZZ,, formula. In particular, this formula accumulates all (finitely 
many) equality axioms in our language and a finite ZZz axiomatization of EA. 
Consider a cut-free derivation of a sequent of the form 3x0 . . . 3xn a, Il, where ZZ is a 
set of ZZ, formulas. By the subformula property, any formula occurring in this derivation 
either(a)hastheform3x~...3x,C((tO,...,t~_,,x~,...,x,),forsomeO~k~mandterms 
to,. . . , t&l, or (b) is a ZZ, formula. 
Now let Z,(m) be a ZZ,, formula naturally expressing the following: 
‘For all p, if p is a cut-free derivation of a sequent of the form Z, n(a), where 
Z is a set formulas of type (a) above, n(a) is a set of ZZ,, formulas, where 
a stands for all the free variables in ZZ, and if the height of p is < m, then 
Vx Truen,,(‘V n(i)‘). 
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Lemma 3.1. T k IT(O) A Vm (IT(~) + Ir(m + 1)). 
Proof. We reason informally within T. IT(O) trivially holds. We show that IT(~) 
implies I~(rn + 1). Thus, we are given a cut-free derivation of height m + 1, of a 
sequent of the form r, ll, where r and Ll are as above, and we must show that the 
disjunction of I7 is True, in the sense of Truen,,, under every substitution of numerals 
for free variables in IZ. For the rest of the proof we fix an arbitrary substitution of 
this kind and treat ZI as if it were a set of sentences. We distinguish several cases, 
according to the form of the last rule applied in the given derivation. 
Case 1: The sequent c ll is a logical axiom, that is, it has the form A, 4, -4 for 
some atomic 4. Since all the formulas of type (a) contain at least one existential 
quantifier and therefore are neither atomic nor negated atomic, both 4 and lb must 
belong to 17. Tarski commutation conditions then imply that 
Trucn,,(‘-4’) H TTruea? (‘4l), 
so we obtain Truen<l (‘41) V Truen,, (‘-$l) and hence Truea, (‘V II’). 
Case 2: The sequent c Il is obtained by a rule introducing a boolean connective 
or a quantifier into a formula from n. All these rules are treated similarly using 
the subformula property of cut-free derivations and Tarski commutation conditions for 
Truen,,. For example, the rule for the universal quantifier has the form 
where a is not free in r, n’. We must show that the formula V fI’VVxc#~(x) is True. By 
the induction hypothesis, since a does not occur free in IZ’, we know that, for each x, 
V L”Vcj(i) is True. Commuting Truea? with the small disjunction we conclude that, for 
each x, either V L” or 4(X) is True. Since n’, and also Truen,,( ‘U’l), do not depend 
on x, it follows that either 17’ is True, or for every x, 4(X) is True. Commuting Trueg, 
with the universal quantifier and then backwards with the disjunction we conclude that 
n’ V b’x4(x) is True. 0 
In the next case we shall be more explicit about parameters. 
Case 3: The last rule introduces the existential quantifier in front of ol, i.e., our 
derivation has the form 
r’, dfo(a), . . . , L-1 (a>3 L(a)>, n(a) 
r:3x,a(to(a),...,t,-l(a>,x,>,n(a)’ 
A free variable a here stands for all the parameters on which 17 and the terms tj may 
depend. 
So, the induction hypothesis is applicable and implies that, for all x, either the 
disjunction of n(x), or a(t&), . . . , tm(X)) is True. We must, reasoning inside T, refute 
the second alternative. 
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Notice that, although, in general, ti are ‘nonstandard’ terms, CI is a fixed ‘standard’ 
II ,,+I formula. Therefore Tarski’s commutation lemma (6) can be applied to tl, after 
evaluating the term t. Thus, by (7) and (6) we obtain 
Truen,,(‘H&@), . . . , t&i))‘) A i; eval(ti, (x)) = Yi -+ Truea,(‘a(~,,...,~,)l) 
i=o 
-+ U(Yo,...,Y,) 
Since the evaluation function is provably total in EA, it follows that 
Trueg,(ra(G), . . . , M~)F) 
implies 3~0 . . . y, a(Y0, . . . , y,), that is, yields a contradiction in T. Thus, we see 
that, for any to, . . . , tm and x, the formula tx(to(X), . . , t,(f)) cannot be True, hence the 
disjunction of II(Z) is True. 
Case 4: c II is obtained by a rule introducing any other existential quantifier into a 
formula from r. Then our claim follows immediately from the induction hypothesis, 
because the Xl part of the premise in this case is the same as that of the conclusion. 
0 
An immediate corollary of the above lemma is that 
[T, n,-IR] E Vm IT(m). 
Notice that for T containing EA and n B 2, obviously, 
(9) 
[T, II,-IR] t- SUPEXP. 
On the other hand, it is well known (cf. [4]) that Ido + SUPEXP is a strong enough 
theory to prove the Cut-elimination Theorem for first-order logic. In order to derive 
RFNn,,(T) we reason inside [T,IZ,-IR], for every particular fl, formula A(x), as fol- 
lows. 
Suppose Provr(‘A(i)l). Then the sequent 3x0 . . .3x,,, ct(xg, . . . ,x,), A(f) is logically 
provable. By (formalized) cut-elimination theorem we obtain a cut-free proof of this 
sequent, and by (9) conclude that Truen,,( ‘A(i)‘) holds. Tarski commutation lemma 
(6) then yields A(x). 0 
The rest of this section is devoted to various remarks, corollaries and comments 
concerning Theorem 1. Let, for a fixed n 2 1, (TX denote the sequence of theories 
based on iteration of the H, reflection principle over T: 
(T);; e r, (TX,, = (TX + Rf%,((T);h (T)“, = U (TX. 
Similarly, [T, nn-IR]k is defined by repeated application of II,-IR: 
[T, nn-IR]o =+ T, [r, nn-IR]k+l = [[T, nn-IR]k, 17~IR]. 
We obviously have 
T + I?,-IR = u [T, n,-IR]k. 
k>O 
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Since for r.e. T containing EA the schema RFNn,,(T) is equivalent to a single ZZn 
sentence, Theorem 1 can be applied repeatedly and we obtain 
Corollary 3.2. Let T be a finite Z&,+1 axiomatized theory containing EA (or IA0 + 
SUPEXP for n = 1). Then 
T + ZZ,-IR = (T);. 
Moreover, for all k 2 1, we actually have 
[r, nn-IRl/t = CT);, 
that is, k (nested) applications of induction rule precisely correspond to k iterations 
of rejection principle over T. 
Corollary 3.3. For &,+I axiomatized theories T containing EA (or ZAa+SUPEXP for 
n = l), the closure of T under ZZ,, induction rule is a rejlexive theory, and hence it is 
not finitely axiomatizable, unless it is inconsistent. The same holds for any extension 
of T + ZZ,-IR by C, sentences. 
Remark 3.4. Theorem 1 shows that some conservation results for fragments of arith- 
metic and for iterated reflection principles are mutually interderivable. A well-known 
theorem due to Parsons, Mints, Takeuti and others states that ZC, is conservative over 
EA+ZZ,+l-IR for Z7,+i sentences. This result follows at once from Leivant’s equivalent 
characterization of C,-IA as RFN n,,+z(EA) over EA (cf. [6]) and the characterization of 
ZZ,+t-IR in terms of reflection principles in Corollary 3.2. Indeed, by the so-called fine 
structure theorem of Schmerl (cf. [14]) we know that RFNn,,+,(EA) is a ZZ,+t conser- 
vative extension of (EA)::‘, which is equivalent to EA + ZZ,+i-IR by Corollary 3.2. 3 
On the other hand, this particular case of Schmerl’s theorem obviously follows from 
Parsons’ result, too. The relationship between the 4 mentioned results can be summa- 
rized in the following diagram: 
G -n,,+, EA + ZZ,+I -1R 
EA + MNn,,,, W 1 -rz,,+, (EA);+’ 
The ‘horizontal’ conservation results are due to Parsons and Schmerl, and the ‘vertical’ 
equivalences are Leivant’s and ours (Corollary 3.2). 
An interesting particular case of Theorem 1 concerns the induction rule for Zi’i 
formulas. It is well-known that the uniform reflection principle for ZZi formulas for a 
3 Schmerl formulated his result for the hierarchy of (transfinitely iterated) reflection principles over PRA, 
but it is not difficult to check that his proof essentially works over EA as well. 
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theory T is equivalent to consistency assertion for T, Con(T). So, Corollary 3.2 can 
be reformulated as follows. 
Corollary 3.5. For finite II2 axiomatized theories T containing Ido + SUPEXP, 
T -t nl-IR = T + Con( 7’) + Con(Con(T)) + . . (10) 
Clearly, for a sound theory T, T + ni-IR is an extension of T by true ZIt axioms, 
and hence both T and T + ni-IR have the same class of provably recursive functions. 
Despite that, T + 171-IR is stronger than T and the equivalence (10) gives us a precise 
measure of its relative strength. 
Remark 3.6. In paper [18] there is a confusion concerning ZIi-IR. Theorem 2.1.3 of 
that paper is false for it implies that EA + Hi-IR contains more provably recursive 
functions than EA. 4 
Theorem 2.1.7 of that paper states that the closure of EA under k applications of 
nz-IR (in our terminology, [EA,n,-IR]k) is conservative over the arithmetic corre- 
sponding to the (k + 3)rd class of Grzegorczyk hierarchy. This theorem is correct and 
closely parallel to another particular case of our Theorem 2 (cf. Corollary 7.5). 
Remark 3.7. A characterization of nt-IR for theories weaker than Ido + SUPEXP 
can be obtained in the spirit of Wilkie and Paris [21]. In this situation the family of 
consistency assertions w.r.t. proofs of bounded cut-rank Conk(T), k 2 0, plays the role 
of the single consistency assertion Con(T) for T. Since EA is a strong enough theory to 
prove Cut-elimination Theorem for derivations of bounded cut-rank, a quick inspection 
of the given proof of Theorem 1 yields the following result: for T containing EA, 
[T, ni-IR] is equivalent to T together with all Conk(U) such that k 80 and U is a 
finite lI2 axiomatized subtheory of T. 
Our next goal is the characterization of C,, induction rule in the spirit of Theorem 1. 
Parsons showed that C,-IR is equivalent to n,+l-IR over EA. However, the two rules 
are not congruent and so, a more careful analysis is needed here. Let me explain why 
the simple proof of Theorem 1 cannot be easily adapted to the C, case. 
The technical reason is that the formula 1r(m) in that proof involves a number of 
outer universal quantifiers, and therefore does not have the required C,, form. Some of 
these quantifiers, e.g., the quantifier over all derivations p, can actually be bounded. 
One can replace the induction on the height m of a proof by IR, over Giidel numbers 
p of proofs using the fact that, under the standard coding, subderivations of p have 
smaller Giidel numbers. However, there does not seem to be an easy way to get rid of 
the quantifier over all substitutions of numerals for free variables in the end-sequent. 
4 Lemma 2.1.4 is true, but it is not difficult to see that the schema of ‘restricted primitive recursion’ dealt 
with there is actually equivalent to the unrestricted primitive recursion. So, the proof-theoretic analysis in 
this lemma, as it is formulated, gives us no more information about the strength of I7l-IR than the reduction 
of I7,-IR to Z,-IR. 
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The only possibility here seems to be to keep those variables free, as the parameters of 
the formula 1,. Yet, this possibility is blocked by the simple fact that some sequents 
in the proof p may contain many more parameters than the end-sequent, and we ought 
to take them all into account. There is one rare situation where this difficulty does not 
arise: simply, if there are no universal quantifiers in the end-sequent. This idea allows 
us to analyze the Cr induction rule. Then, by skolemization, we will be able to pull 
the result up in the arithmetical hierarchy. This project is carefully elaborated in the 
remaining part of the paper. 
4. Provably recursive functions 
In this section we recall some basic facts about provably (total) recursive functions 
(p.t.r.fs) of theories and characterize these functions for closures of theories under Cr 
induction rule. Most of these results are folklore or close to be so. 
We shall deal with various classes of number-theoretic functions. The basic class 
is the class of elementary functions 6’. For a class K, C(K) denotes the closure of 
K u & under composition. [K, PR] denotes the closure of KU E under composition and 
one application of primitive recursion, i.e., the class C(F), where F is the set of all 
functions f(n, a) definable by a schema of the form 
f(O> a) = s(a), 
f(n + 1,~)=4f(n,~),n,~), 
for g,h E C(K). E(K) is the elementary closure of K, that is, the class of func- 
tions obtained from K U d by closure under composition and bounded sums and 
products. It is well-known (cf. [13]) that, over a sufficiently large stock of initial 
elementary functions and modulo composition, bounded summation and multiplica- 
tion are equivalent to bounded recursion, which, in turn, is equivalent to bounded 
minimization. 
Definition 4. A number-theoretic function f(x) is called provably recursive in a theory 
T iff the graph of f can be represented by a Z;I formula t&x, y) such that 
TkVxX!y$(x,y). 
The class of p.t.r.fs of a theory T is denoted S(T). 
It is easy to see that graphs of p.t.r.fs are actually Al in T. The class 9(T) is 
closed under composition, but not necessarily elementarily closed, even if T contains 
EA. This creates for us some additional difficulties, since proof-theoretically it is much 
more common and pleasant to deal with elementarily closed classes of functions. Some- 
times one considers p.t.r.fs with elementary graphs, that is, with the formula $(x, y) 
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elementary. 5 These classes of functions are closed under bounded minimization, but 
not under composition. However, the following obvious proposition holds. 
Proposition 4.1. For a theory T containing EA, every p. t.r.f can be obtained by 
composition from a p. t.r.f with an elementary graph and a fixed elementary function. 
Proof. Let $(x, y) := 3z $o(z,x, y), where $0 is elementary, define the graph of f, so 
that 
T k Vxk3!y $(x, y). 
Using the standard pairing function we let 
~(x,Y):=~o((Y)o,x,(Y)1) Ab < (Y>o -f+O(ZJ,(Y>l). 
Then it is not difficult to check that 4 defines a certain p.t.r.f g in T, 4 is elementary, 
and for all n, f(n) = (g(n)), . 0 
Since 9(T) only depends on the II2 fragment of T, we shall concentrate our attention 
on II2 axiomatized theories. 
Definition 5. Let 71 := Vx 3 y+(x, y) E II2, with 4 elementary. A function f(x) is called 
a witness of 71 iff Vx 4(x,f(x)) holds in the standard model of arithmetic. 
Every true II, sentence has a witness. The function fn(x) whose graph is defined 
by the formula 4(x, y) A Vz < y +(x,2) is called the standard witness of 7c. 
Proposition 4.2. Let T be a jinite II2 axiomatized sound extension of EA, and let f 
be the standard witness of the single axiom of T. Then ?B( T) = C( f ). 
Proof. Obviously, f is a p.t.r.f in T, and so C(f) C 23(T). The opposite inclusion is, 
more or less, a direct consequence of Herbrand’s Theorem. Consider a purely universal 
formulation of EA (in a language with symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions), 
and add to this language a new function symbol f together with the axiom 
vcd 4(X> f (x)), 
where Vx’x3.y 4(x, y) is the single axiom of T over EA. Using appropriate Kalmar 
elementary terms we can get rid of all bounded quantifiers in (6. Hence, the resulting 
theory is a conservative extension of T and has a purely universal axiomatization. 
Now suppose T k Vx3! y 3z&(x, y,z), where $0 is elementary (and in our formulation 
also quantifier-free). Since T has a purely universal axiomatization, by Herbrand’s 
theorem we obtain terms tl,. . . , tk, ~1,. . . , uk of the extended language such that 
T k $o(a, ti(a), W(a)) v . . . v $o(a, tk(ah uk(a)). 
5 Elementary formulas are bounded formulas in the language of EA with symbols for all Kalmar elementary 
functions. 
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Clearly, the terms ti and Ui represent functions in C(f). Now we let 
I 
t1(x> 
t26) 
t(x):= ... 
tk(x) 
0 
The function U(X) is 
function 
Cond(x, y, z) : = 
if +0(x, h(x), w(x)), 
if rl/~(x,t~(x),~dx)) and +o(x,~I(x),uI(x)), 
. . 
if &(x,tk(x),nk(x)) and ~&(X,ti(X),Ui(X)) for all i < k, 
otherwise. 
defined in a similar manner, with ui’s in place of ti’s. Since the 
x if z=O, 
y ifz#O 
is elementary, the class C(f) is closed under definitions by cases and so, t(x) and 
u(x) can be adequately defined by C(f) terms. For these terms we obviously have 
T k $o(a, t(u), u(a)). It follows that 
and by the functionality of II/ 
T k vx,x, (@>=y ++ t&y)). 
Since all theorems of T are true, t,G represents the graph of t(x) in the standard 
model. 0 
Remark 4.3. We have actually shown that 9(T) & C(f) for any witness f of the 
axiom of T, not just for the standard one. 
Corollary 4.4. Let T be a jinite II2 axiomatized sound extension of EA. Then the 
class 9(T) has a jinite basis under composition. 
Proof. Follows from the previous proposition and the fact that d has a finite basis 
(cf, e.g., [7, 91). It might be interesting for the reader to notice that, if we had been 
slightly more careful in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we could actually have inferred 
the existence of a finite basis in 6’ from finite axiomatizability of EA. 
Consider a finite Zi’z axiomatization of EA in the usual language of arithmetic (see 
[4]). Introduce finitely many (Kalmar elementary) functions to quantifier-free represent 
do parts of those & axioms. Then we have to introduce finitely many Skolem functions 
for these axioms in order to obtain a purely universal conservative extension of EA. 
Essentially, the same proof as for Proposition 4.2 then shows that every provably 
recursive function can be defined by a term in the extended language. In the process 
we would have to introduce a few more elementary functions like Cond(x, y,z) or 
pairing functions. We omit the details. 0 
Remark 4.5. The converse of the previous corollary does not hold, essentially because 
of the difference between provably recursive functions and programs. For example, the 
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theory (,!?A); extends EA purely universally and therefore has the same, finitely based, 
class of p.t.r.fs. Yet, this theory is not finitely axiomatizable. 
Proposition 4.6. Let T be a finite II2 axiomatized sound extension of EA, and let f 
be the standard witness of the single axiom of T. Then 
KT,Cl-W)=[C(f ),W. 
Proof. Let g(n,x) be defined by a schema of primitive recursion 
g(O) = c(x), 
s(n + 1,x) =h(g(n,x),n,x). 
such that e, h E C(f ). Since all functions in C(f) are p.t.r.f in T, graphs of e and 
h are defined by Ct formulas E(x, y) and H(z,n,x, y) := 30 Ho(u,z,n,x, y), with HO 
elementary. 
The graph of g is most naturally defined (in the standard model) by the following 
formula (that uses elementary coding of sequences): 
g(n,x) = y :* 3~ E Seq ((s)o = e(x) A Vi < n (s)i+l = h((s)i, i,x) A (s), = y). 
However, in absense of Cl collection principle this formula may not be equivalent to a 
Ct formula within T. We modify it as follows (a somewhat similar trick was employed 
earlier in the proof of Proposition 2.3): g(n,x) = y :+-+ 
%V E Seq (E(x,(s)o) AK < nHo((v)i,(s)i,i,x,(s)i+l) A (s), =Y). (11) 
This formula is obviously Ci, and now we shall show the totality of g in [T, Ci-IR]. 
Clearly, T k 3y g(O,x) = y, because e(x) is provably total. In order to see that 
we argue informally as follows. Suppose g(n,x) = y and thus we are given two se- 
quences s and u of length n + 1 satisfying (11). We have to construct appropriate 
sequences of length n + 2. Since the function h is provably total, we can find a z such 
that h(y,n,x) =z. Hence there is a w such that Ho(w, y,n,x,z) holds. Pick any such 
w and add the element z to the end of the sequence s, and w to the end of v. The 
resulting sequences are as required. Applying Ct-IR we obtain 
[T, Ci-IR] F Vn3y g(n,x) = y. 
To prove the functionality of g we reason as follows. Let R(n,s, u,x, y) denote 
the elementary part of the formula (1 1 ), and suppose we have R(n,sl, 01 ,x, yt ) and 
R(n,s2,~2,x,y2). We prove Vi<n (sl)i=(sz)i by induction on i (with n,sj,vj,x,yj as 
free parameters). Notice that the induction is elementary, although it is applied as a 
schema rather than as a rule here. Basis and induction step follow at once from the 
functionality of e and h. So we obtain (si )n = (sz)~, and therefore yi = ~2. Notice that 
the argument for the functionality was actually carried out in T. 
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Now we shall show that p.t.r.fs of [T,Ci-IR] belong to [C(f),PR]. Since [T,Ci-IR] 
is a sound I72 axiomatized theory, it suffices to demonstrate that every formula obtained 
by an application of Ci-IR has a witnessing function in the class [C(f),PR]. (Here 
we actually apply Remark 4.3 rather than Proposition 4.2.) 
Consider an arbitrary elementary formula ,4(x, y, a) such that 
T t- 3YA(o,Y,a), 
Tl-Vx(3yA(x,y,u)+ 3yA(x+ l,y,a)). 
By Proposition 4.2 we obtain functions e(a) and h(y,x, a) in C(f) such that e witnesses 
VZlyA(0, y, a), and h witnesses 
Consider a primitive recursion 
do, a) = e(a), 
dx+ l,~)=h(dx,~),x,~). 
Straightforward induction on x then shows that A(x,g(x,u),u) holds in the standard 
model for all x and a. This means that g(x, a) witnesses Vx,&ly ,4(x, y, a). 0 
Corollary 4.7. For a sound II2 axiomatized theory T containing EA, 
g([T,C,-IR])=[G@T),PR]. 
Proof. We only have to notice that for such theories T, 9([T, Ci-IR]) is the union of 
9( [To, Ci-IR]) for all finite subtheories To of T. 0 
Remark 4.8. Notice that the requirement of ZI2 axiomatizability of T in the previous 
corollary cannot, in general, be dropped. Let T = EA+S, where S is the sentence Si + S2 
and Si = RF’Nn,,, (EA) for i = 1,2. Clearly, S is a true Us sentence. By Theorem 2 
to be proved in Section 7, [EA, Ci-IR] t- Si ; hence [T, Ci-IR] t S2 and 9([T, Cl -IR]) 
contains all primitive recursive functions. (It is easy to see, cf. e.g. Ono [8], that & 
implies ICi over EA.) 
On the other hand, S is lI2 conservative over EA because for rr E II*, EA + S k n 
implies EA t +I + 71, whence 
EA E ProvEA(rnl) A -VC + rc, 
and EA !- 71 by Lob’s theorem. It follows that 9(T) coincides with d, and [9(T),PR] 
is properly contained in the class of all primitive recursive functions. 0 
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5. Elementary closure 
As we have noted before, the class 9(T) need not be elementarily closed even if the 
theory T contains EA. In this section we shall investigate this question in more detail 
and formulate sufficient conditions for 9(T) to be elementarily closed. A version of 
the following proposition can be found in [9] with a more complicated proof. 
For a function f(x), let f(n) := (f(O), . . . , f(n)). 
Proposition 5.1. E(f) = C(r). 
Proof. Obviously f E E(f), so C(f) C E(f). For the opposite inclusion we prove that 
xi_ g(i, y) E C(j) if g(x, y) E C(f). (Bounded products are treated similarly.) 
Let (z r n) denote the initial segment of a sequence z of length 12 + 1. This function is 
clearly Kalmar elementary. Since g E C(f), g can be considered as a term in a language 
with symbols for all elementary functions and a symbol for f. We systematically 
replace all occurrences of subterms of the form r(t) in g by (z It), where z is a new 
variable. (It does not matter, in what order these occurrences are replaced.) As a result 
we obtain an elementary function g”(x, y,z). Define 
G(x, y>z) := C g”(i, Y,z). 
i&x 
We claim that 
iFx g(i> Y> = G(x, Y, f@k ~1)) 
for a certain term b(x, y) E C(T). We only need to ensure that the value of b(x, y) is 
greater than all values t(i, y) for i<x, where terms t occur in the context j(t) within 
g. Notice that f is an increasing function. Therefore, we can majorize each t(x,y) by 
an increasing function in C(f) and take the sum of all these functions as b(x,y). 0 
Notice that the previous proposition can be generalized to E(fi, . . , fn) = 
w,,..., fn) either by encoding ft,. . . , fn into a single function using the pairing 
and projection mechanism, or just by generalizing the proof of Proposition 5.1. 
Proposition 5.2. If f(x) is increasing and the graph off is elementary, then 7 E C(f) 
and therefore C( f ) = E( f ). 
Proof. If f is increasing, for a certain elementary function b we have 
f(n) = pz<b(n, f(n)) Vidn (z)i= f(i), 
because the code of a sequence can be estimated elementarily in its length and the 
largest element (= f (n)). 0 
Proposition 5.1 also has the following useful corollary. 
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Proposition 5.3. For uny class of functions K, the class [K, PR] is elementarily closed. 
Proof. The class [K, PR] is generated by all functions from K, 8, and functions f (n, a) 
obtained by primitive recursion 
f (0, a) = s(a), 
f (n + 1, a) = h(f (n, a), n, a) 
for g, h E C(K). By Proposition 5.1 it is sufficient to show that, together with any 
such f, the class [K,PR] also contains the function f,, where f,(n) := f ((n)O,(n)l). 
If (n+ l)~ >O, then 
fi(n+l)=f((n+l)o,(n+lh) 
=h(f((n+l)o - l,(n+l)l),(n+1)0 - l,(n+l)l) 
=hl(fl(p(n+l)),n) 
for some hl EC(K), where p(n) := ((n)o - l,(n),). Notice that P(n+l) < n+l, if 
(n + l)o > 0. (The standard pairing function (x, y) is monotonic in both arguments.) 
On the other hand, if (n + 1 )O = 0 then, obviously, fi (n + 1) = g((n + 1 )I ). It follows 
that 7, can be defined by the following primitive recursion: 
f,(n) * h((fl(n))p(n+l),n) 
fi(n+ ‘)= f,(n)*g((n+ l),) {- 
if (n + 1)0 # 0, 
if (n + 1 )O = 0. 
Here * denotes the operation of adjoining an element at the end of a sequence. •i 
Now we turn to proof-theoretic analogs of the above lemmas. 
Definition 6. Let rc be a IZ2 sentence. TT is monotonic, if there is an elementary formula 
4(x, y) such that EA proves that 
1. = c, VX’x3Y 4(x, Y), 
2. 4(x, y) A 4(x, z) + Y = z, 
3. ~(~l,y)A~(X2,~)AXI~X2-‘Y~Z. 
Informally, rc is monotonic iff it is equivalent to a sentence whose only witness is 
provably increasing. 
Proposition 5.4. Let T be a II2 axiomatized theory containing EA. The following 
statements are equivalent: 
1. T is axiomatizable over EA by monotonic II2 sentences; 
2. T is closed under Cl collection rule: 
C, -CR Vx3 y 4(x, y) k k’x’x3 yV’u 6x3~ <y&u, v), 
where 4(x, y) E Cl. 
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Proof. Clearly, the formula Vx3yV’u 6x3~ d y4(u, V) implies Vx3y 4(x, y) in EA and 
is monotonic, whenever q5 is elementary. So, we may apply Ci collection rule to all 
axioms of T and obtain a monotonic axiomatization. 
In order to show that Statement 1 implies 2 we take an axiomatization of T over EA 
by II2 formulas whose standard witnesses are monotonic. Then we introduce Skolem 
functions for all these formulas and replace axioms rr := Vx3y4(x,y) of T by their 
skolemizations ‘dx 4(x, fn(x)). The resulting theory T* proves monotonicity of all these 
functions fK: 
XI 6X2+f&I)~fn(x2)~ 
Besides, it is conservative over T, and has a purely universal axiomatization (if EA is 
taken in a universal formulation). 
Now assume T 1 b’x3y $(x, y) for a formula $ E Ci. By Herbrand’s theorem we can 
obtain a monotonic term t(x) in the extended language such that 
T* t- t’x’x3y <t(x) $(x, y). 
(This actually is a version of Par&h’s theorem for T* (cf. [4, p. 2721). Here we use 
the fact that every elementary function can be majorized by an increasing one, and 
hence any term in the extended language can.) Provable monotonicity of t(x) then 
implies 
T* ~VX~~=~(,)~‘U~X~U~~~(U,U). 
The result follows by conservativity of T* over T. 0 
Corollary 5.5. A II2 sentence Vx3y4(x,y) is monotonic ifs 
EA b Vx3y 4(x, y) + Vx3yVu <x3 d y$(u, u). 
Corollary 5.6. For a sound II2 axiomatized theory T containing EA, 
1. [T,C,-CR] = T + C,-CR, 
2. 9( T + C,-CR) = E(9(T)). 
Proof. Part 1 follows from the fact that, for a II2 axiomatized theory T, [T, Cl -CR] can 
be axiomatized by monotonic I72 sentences. The inclusion 9( T + Cl-CR) > E(9( T)) 
follows from the fact that T + Cl-CR is axiomatizable by a set of monotonic Z72 
sentences, whose witnessing functions are increasing and have elementary graphs, so 
that the class 9( T+Ci-CR) is elementarily closed by Proposition 5.2. 
By the definition of Cl-CR, each of the witnessing functions for the axioms of 
[T, Cl -CR] either coincides with one of T, or has the form maxi<, &(i), where n 
is an axiom of T. Hence, it belongs to E(g(Y)), and the inclusion 9( [ T, Z1 -CR]) 
2 E(S(T)) follows by Proposition 4.2. q 
Corollary 5.7. If a sound theory T containing EA is closed under Cl collection rule, 
then 9(T) is elementarily closed. 
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The following proposition reveals a useful ‘monotonizing’ property of Zi induction 
rule. 
Proposition 5.8. For any theory T extending EA, [T, Ci-IR] is axiomatizable by mono- 
tonic ZZ2 sentences over T. Zf T itself is ZZ2 axiomatized, [T, Ci-IR] is axiomatizable 
by monotonic ZZ2 sentences over EA. 
Proof. The proof is, essentially, a formalization of Proposition 5.3. Suppose 4(x, y,a) 
is elementary and 
T t- 3~ $40, Y, a), 
T~Vx(3y~(x,y,a)~3y~(x+l,y,a)). 
Then we define 
$‘(x, Y> := Vi <x&(90, (Y>i, (41 1, 
and somewhat similarly to the proof of Proposition 5.3 show that 
T I- 3~ #CO, Y>, 
T k V,Y (3~ 4’(x, Y> -+ 3~ 4’(x + 1, Y)>. 
Applying Ci-IR we obtain VE!y #(x, y) and 
The latter formula is monotonic and implies Va,x3 y$(x, y, a). It follows that [T, Cl -IR] 
is axiomatized by monotonic sentences over T. 
A similar argument shows that for each theorem of T of the form Vx’x3 y 4(x, y), 
with 4 elementary, the formula Vx3 yb’u Cc3v d y $(u, v) is provable in [T, X1 -IR]. So, 
if T is II2 axiomatized, in an axiomatization of [T, Zi-IR] the axioms of T can also 
be replaced by monotonic sentences. q 
Corollary 5.9. For a sound ZZ2 axiomatized theory T containing EA the class 
CB( [T, C I -IR] ) is elementarily closed. 
Remark 5.10. This fact can also be directly inferred from Proposition 5.3 and 
Corollary 4.7. 
Finally, we formulate a technically very useful proposition that also relies on mono- 
tonicity properties of functions and states, roughly, that for a provably increasing func- 
tion f the induction schema for formulas elementary in f is reducible to the induction 
schema for formulas elementary in the graph of f. This fact is essentially due to 
Gaifman and Dimitracopoulos [3]. A somewhat weaker version can be found in [4, 
Proposition 1.3, p. 2711 and we follow the idea of these proofs very closely. 
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Let do(f) denote the class of bounded formulas in the language of EA (with symbols 
for all elementary functions) enriched by a function symbol f(x), where, in particular, 
f may occur in bounding terms. Let F(x, y) denote the formula f(n) = y defining the 
graph of f. do(F) formulas are those built up from F(x, y) and elementary ones using 
boolean connectives and quantifiers bounded by elementary functions. Finally, let T be 
the theory in the above language obtained by adding to all axioms of EA the axiom 
%Y(XG.Y + f(x)Gf(y)) 
asserting the monotonicity of f. 
Proposition 5.11. Over the theory T the induction schemata for Ao( f) formulas and 
do(F) formulas are deductively equivalent. 
Proof. First of all, notice that any term t in the language of T can be provably 
majorized by a term provably increasing in each variable (because every elementary 
function is majorizable by a monotonic one). We fix one such term for every term t 
and call it 1. 
Lemma 5.12. For every term s(Z) there is a monotonic term t(d) and a do(F) for- 
mula $(a’, b, y) such that 
T I- ‘v’y > t(Z) (s(Z) = b ++ I,@, b, y)). 
Proof. The argument goes by induction on the build-up of s. For the induction step 
one reasons as follows. If s(Z) has the form g(si(Z)), where si is a term, and g is 
either f or an elementary function symbol, then by the induction hypothesis one has 
a term t](Z) and a do(F) formula $t(Z, b, y) such that provably in T 
~(a’) = b * til(%b,y) 
for y3 tl(a’). Then we let 
t(Z) := t,(z) + ?,(a-), 
and it is easy to see 
d.n(a)) = b ++ 
A similar reduction 
argument. 0 
that for y> t(Z) there holds 
~U<Y ($l(a’,vv,~) A g(v) = b). 
applies in the case when the function g has more than one 
Lemma 5.13. For every do(f) formula $(Z) there is a do(F) formula ll/o(Z, ye, 
. . , y,,) and provably monotonic terms tl (Z), tz(Z, y1 ), . . , t,,(ii, yl, . . . , y,,_l ) such that 
T t i yibti(li,yl ,...,Yi-l) + ($42) H ~O(/o(ii,Yl~~~~~Yrz))~ 
i=l 
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Proof. We argue by induction on the build-up of the do(f) formula II/. 
induction follows from Lemma 5.12, so we concentrate our attention upon 
difficult case, when $ has the form 
vu &s(Z) 4(a’, 24). 
Basis of 
the most 
(12) 
Applying the induction hypothesis to &ii,u) we obtain a da(F) formula &(Z,U, 
yl,. . . ,yn) and monotonic terms st(ii,u),. . .,s,,(ii,u,y~,. . . ,y,_l) such that, provably 
in T, 
$oG, 4 Yl, . . ., y, ) * 4G u>, (13) 
whenever yi 2 si(ii, U, yt , . . . , yi_ 1) for all 1 < i <n. Besides, by Lemma 5.12 we obtain 
a monotonic term r(Z,~u) and a da(F) formula r(Z,u,z) such that 
r(Z, U,Z) ++ U <s(Z) 
for z>r(Z,r4). 
We introduce two fresh variables, y,+l and yn+2, and let &(a’, yt,. . . , yn+2) be de- 
fined as follows: 
~~GYn+l (~(~,%Yn+z) + 4OG,%Yl,...,Yn)). 
We also let 
(14) 
fi(ii,Yl,..., Yi-1) :=Si(8~(a'),Yl,...,yi-~) 
for i<n, and let &+t(Z,yr ,..., y,,) := s”(Z), and &+@,yt,.. .,y,,+t) := r(ii,y,+t). 
In order to see that the claim of our lemma holds, that is, that formula (14) is 
provably equivalent to V’u<s(Z) $(ii,u) for yi sufficiently large w.r.t. each other, we 
first notice that u < yn+l implies r(S, U) < r(ii, yn+t ) < yn+2 by provable monotonicity 
of the term r and by the choice of y,,+z. It follows that, under these assumptions, 
~(a’, U, yn+2) is equivalent to u <~(a’), which implies u <s”(Z), and by monotonicity of 
terms si for any such u we have 
y1 ah@) = Sl(a-,.qa’)>~Sl(~,~), 
y2 >f2G>Yl> = ~2(~,~(a-),Yl)~~2(~,~,Yl), 
. . . . . . 
Yi7Zb4ii,Ylr...r Yn-I> =~n~~,~~~~,Yl,...,Y,-l~~~,(~,~,Yl,...,Y,-l). 
It follows that the induction hypothesis is applicable and yields (13). From this it is 
easy to conclude that formula (12) implies (14). The opposite implication is proved in 
a similar way. 0 
To complete the proof of Proposition 5.11 we prove do(J) induction in the form 
of the least number principle 
I++, a’) + 3x’ <x (lj(x’, a’)AVz < x’ +z, a-)) 
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for an arbitrary dc( f) formula $(x, Fi). We apply Lemma 5.13 to II/ and reason inside 
T plus da(F) induction as follows. 
Assume $(x, a’) and that yi , . . . , yn satisfy the premise of the implication in Lemma 
5.13, so that we may infer &-,(x,Z,~) from Ii/(x, a’) (notice that some such yi, . . , yn 
provably exist). Applying the least element principle for $0 (variables ; as well as a’ 
act as free parameters) we obtain an x’ <x such that 
Now we notice that, by monotonicity of terms ti, for all i <n we have 
and so the premise of the implication in Lemma 5.13 is satisfied for x’, as well as 
for any z < x’ (for the same reason). It follows that x’ is, indeed, the least number 
satisfying 4(x, Z). 0 
Remark 5.14. Notice that we have actually reduced do(f) induction to the one for 
do(F) formulas whose bounding terms are plain variables. 
6. Evaluation 
The aim of this section is to show that the universal function for the class of p.t.r.fs 
of a finite D2 axiomatized theory T belongs to [9(T), PR], and therefore can be 
represented in [T, Ci-IR]. As a by-product we obtain a new and very transparent proof 
of a theorem of Peter (cf. [ 121 and also [13]) stating that so-called nested recursion 
on o is reducible to primitive recursion. 
Let f(x) be a function. Every function of the class C(f) can be represented by 
a term in a language containing a function symbol for f and finitely many function 
symbols for a certain basis in 8 (cf. Proposition 4.4). We call these functions initial 
functions, and the terms of this language will be called f-terms. We fix a natural 
elementary Gijdel numbering of f-terms. 
The evaluation function evalf(e,x) for f-terms is defined as follows: 
evalf(e,x) := C t((x)o,. . ., (x),) if e = rtl for an f-term t(x0,. . . ,xn), 0 otherwise. 
It will also be technically convenient to unify the two arguments of evalf(e,x) and 
introduce the functions eval;(x) := evalf((x)c, (x)1 ) and 
eval,(x) := (eva$(O), . . . , evali(x)). 
Proposition 6.1. [C(f),PR] = C(evalf) = C(evalf). 
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Proof. First we show that both evalf and evalf belong to [C(f),PR]. The definition 
of evalf can obviously be rewritten as a primitive ‘course of values’ recursion: 
1. eval/(e,x) := (x)i, if e = ‘Xi’, where Xi is the ith variable, 
2. evalf(e,x) := h(evalf(rcO’,x) ,..., eval,-(r&1,x)), if e = rh(tc ,..., tm)l, and h is 
an initial function, 
3. eval/(e,x) := 0, if none of the above cases holds. 
Since there are only finitely many initial functions, this definition has the form of a 
definition by cases. The cases are Kalmar elementarily recognizable by the naturality 
assumption on the coding off -terms. It is well known and easy to see that the ‘course 
of values’ recursion defining evalf can be reduced to the usual primitive recursion for 
the function evalf, from which evalf can be recovered as 
evalf(e,x) = (evalf((eA))(,,) (15) 
(compare with our proof of Proposition 5.3). 
Now we shall show that C(eval,-) contains [C( f ), PR]. Consider a primitive recur- 
sive definition 
do, a) = so(a), 
for some f-terms go(a) and h(x, y, a). We shall express g(n, a) in the form 
eval&(n), (4 ) 
for a function s(n) to be found. Let num(n) denote the index of a constant f-term 
with value n, and let Sub,,(e,i,j) compute the index of an f-term that results in 
simultaneous substitution of f-terms i and j for variables x and y respectively in an 
f-term e. It is easy to see that functions Sub and num are elementary. Then we can 
define s(n) as follows: 
s(0) := ‘go’, 
s(n + 1) := SubXJrhl,s(n),num(n)). (16) 
By induction on n one easily shows that s(n) is a Giidel number of an f-term t,(u) 
such that t,,(u) = g(n,u) for all a. Hence eval,-(s(n), (u)) = g(n,u) for all a and n. So, 
it only remains to prove that primitive recursion (16) is bounded. Let 1 t1 denote the 
length (= number of symbols) of a term with index t. For Sub we have the following 
estimate: 
ISubJe,i,j)l <C. 14 maxtlil, Ijl>, 
because the total number of occurrences of variables x and y in a term e is less than 
]eJ. On the other hand, the length of num(n) is at worst linear in n. So, for large 
enough n we have 
Is(n + l)l <Cl . Is(n 
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It follows that Is(n)1 grows at most exponentially, and thereby s(n) has a doubly 
exponential bound. 0 
Two immediate consequences of the above proposition are: 
Corollary 6.2. The class [C(f),PR] is finitely based. 
Corollary 6.3. The class C(evalf) is elementarily closed. 
Another interesting corollary is the reduction of nested recursion to primitive recur- 
sion. A nested recursive definition may have, e.g., the following form: 
do, a> = so(a), 
s(n + La> = ho(g(n,hl(g(n,a),a)),n,a). 
In general, one allows arbitrarily deep nestings of g-terms on the right-hand side of the 
definition, but g must only occur in the context g(n, .), that is, the first argument must 
always be n. An old result of Peter says that nested recursion is reducible to primitive 
recursion, and it is relevant for our work as follows. 
Suppose we want to evaluate a term t(u(x)), where t and u are complex terms. 
Doing this in the most straightforward manner we must first evaluate u and then t, that 
is, 
evalf(‘t(u)l,x) = evalf( rtl, evalf( rul, (x))). 
We see that evalf occurs doubly nested on the right-hand side of the equation. The 
evaluation procedure prescribed by Proposition 6.1 is different: we look at the terms t 
and u as being decomposed into initial functions, and evaluate only one function at a 
step. This is a longer process, although it yields the same result. 
A natural rule to verify the totality of functions defined by nested recursion is II2 
induction rule, rather than Cl-IR, which only works for primitive recursive definitions 
on the face of it. 6 Therefore, it is not surprising that Peter’s theorem is an essential 
element in Parsons’ proof of the equivalence of II2 and Ct induction rules. Here we 
obtain a slightly sharpened version of Peter’s result for free. 
Corollary 6.4. The closure of a class K of functions containing & under one appli- 
cation of nested recursion and composition coincides with [K,PR]. 
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that K has the form C(f). Now 
we almost literally follow the lines of the proof of the second part of Proposition 6.1. 
A function g(n, a) defined by nested recursion from C(f) can be expressed in the form 
6A recently introduced ‘Logic of Primitive Recursion’ by Sieg and Wainer [19] seems to provide a 
relevant framework for the analysis of the intensional phenomenon of correspondence between rules and 
computational schemes. 
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evalf(s(n),a) for a suitable elementary function s. The bound on the rate of growth 
of s, however, will be slightly worse than before. For sufficiently large n we have 
where k is the maximum depth of nestings in the definition of g. However, this means 
that s grows no faster than triply exponentially. 0 
Let T be finite II2 axiomatized extension of EA and let f be the standard witness for 
the single axiom of T. Recall that the graph of f is defined by an elementary formula. 
We shall show that the evaluation function for f-terms can be naturally represented in 
[T, Cl -IR], and that its basic properties are provable in this theory. 
Without loss of generality we may assume that T is formulated in a language con- 
taining function symbols for f and for finitely many initial elementary functions. By 
Propositions 4.6 and 6.1 we know that evalf is provably recursive in [T, Ci-IR], and 
hence its graph can be represented by a certain Ci formula. This formula can be read off 
from the primitive recursive definition of evalf, or rather evalf, using the formalization 
of primitive recursion (11) in the proof of Proposition 4.6. The following somewhat 
sharper observation will be essential for us below. 
Lemma 6.5. The graph of the function evalf is elementary and can be naturally 
dejned by a bounded formula. 
Proof. The formula evalf(x) = y informally tells that y is a sequence of length x + 1 
such that for all u<x, 
1. If (U)O is the Godel number of ith variable, then (Y)~ = ((u)~ )i; 
2. If (u)c is the Giidel number of a term of the form h(tl,. . . , t,) for an initial 
function h and for some terms tl, . . . , tm (whose Code1 numbers ji, . . . , j,,, are bound to 
be smaller than (u)o), then (~1~ = h((y)(~,,(,),), ,(Y)(~,,,,w,)); 
3. (Y)~ = 0, otherwise. 
Let us stress that Clause 2 can only be stated separately for each individual initial 
function h. Since the graph of f is elementary, so is the above formula. 0 
Lemma 6.6. [T,Ci-IR] k Yx3!y evalf(x) = y 
Proof. This is a particular instance of Proposition 4.6. For the definition given in 
Lemma 6.5, the totality of evalf can be directly verified using one application of the 
rule Ci-IR,, which is congruent to Ci-IR. The functionality of evab is established 
within T as in the proof of Proposition 4.6. 0 
A corollary of this lemma is that a function symbol for evalf, and therefore the one 
for evalf, can be introduced within [T,Ci-IR]. Since the definitions of evak and evalf 
are natural, recursive clauses l-3 from the proof of Proposition 6.1 are provable in 
[T, Ci-IR], and we obtain the following statement. 
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Lemma 6.7. [r, Cl -IR] proves 
1. ‘e codes ith variable’ + evalf(e,x) = (x)i; 
2. A:=, ‘ei codes a term’ -+ evalf(Sub,...,,~(‘hl,eo ,..., e,),x) = h(evalf(eo,x), 
. ..) evalf(e,,x)), for any initial function /2(x0,. .,x,). 
The following corollary is standard. 
Proposition 6.8. For any f-term t(xo,. . ,xn), 
[T,Ci-IR] t- evalf(rtl, (x0 ,..., x,)) = t(xo,. ..,x,). 
Proof. By external induction on the build-up of t. 0 
To be able to more fruitfully use the inductive clauses for evalf we need a reasonable 
amount of induction for formulas involving evalf. 
Proposition 6.9. The theory [T, Ci-IR] contains the induction schemu for bounded 
formulas in the language with a function symbol for evalf. 
Proof. Recall that evalf was defined via the function evalf. We observe two things: 
(a) the graph of evalf is elementary, by Lemma 6.5; (b) the function evalf is provably 
increasing in [T, Ci-IR], for obvious reasons. By Proposition 5.11 &(evalf) induction 
is reducible to elementary induction, that is, is provable in [T, Ci-IR]. It remains to 
notice that &(eval~) formulas can be translated into do(eval,) formulas using (15). 0 
Corollary 6.10. [T, Ci-IR] proves that for all terms t(z) in one variable and all 
terms u, 
evalf(SubZ(rtl, ‘ul),x) = eval.f(rtl, (evalf(rul,x))). 
Proof. By &(evalf) induction on the build-up of t, with u and x as free parameters. 0 
7. El induction rule 
Theorem 2. Let T be an arithmetical theory containing EA. Then [T, Cl -IR] is equiv- 
alent to T together with RFNz,(To) f or all$nite II2 axiomatized subtheories TO of T. 
Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1 we can show that, if for I(x) E Ci the 
theory T proves 
Z(0) A vx (Z(x) --) I(x + l)), (17) 
then for a suitable finite I& axiomatized subtheory TO of T one has 
T + FWNZ,(To) I- VxZ(x). 
(For the axioms of TO one may take formula (17) together with all axioms of EA.) 
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For the opposite inclusion it is sufficient to demonstrate that 
for finite n2 axiomatized theories T. Modulo the work we have done in the previous 
sections the argument will be similar to the one in [17, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.1 
We introduce a function symbol f for the standard witness for the single axiom 
of T and finitely many symbols for a suitable basis in 6, so that T attains a purely 
universal axiomatization. It is also essential that the language of T is finite, and that 
T has only finitely many nonlogical axioms in the extended language. 
We know that [T, Cl -IR] has a reasonable evaluation function evalf for terms in the 
language of T. Using evalf first we manufacture a satisfaction predicate for quantifier 
free formuals of T. The following lemma is well-known and easy. 
Lemma 7.1. To every quantifier free formula 4(u) we can associate a term x$(a) 
such that 
T k c)(u) * x,#,(a) = 0. (18) 
Proof. Notice that, provably in T, 
t1(a) = t2(a) * It,(W2(a)l = 0, 
4(a) A b+(a) ++ x4(a) +x$(a) = 09 
l&U) ++ Gus = 0, 
whenever the terms x+ and x$ satisfy equivalence (18) for formulas 4 and $. The 
statement of the lemma follows by induction on the build-up of 4. Cl 
Obviously, the function 
trm : rcj’ t-+ ‘x4’ 
is Kalmar elementary, and Lemma 7.1 is formalizable in EA. We define 
Satf(e, a) := (evalf(trm(e),u) = 0). 
This definition guarantees that Satf is faithfully defined on atomic formulas (by Propo- 
sition 6.8) and provably commutes with all boolean connectives. For example, provably 
in [T, Cl -IR] we have: for all 4, $, 
Satf( ‘4 A $l, a) H eval/-(trm( ‘4 A $l), a) = 0 
H evalf( rx4 + x$l, a) = 0 
c) evalf(trm( ‘+l), a) + eval(trm( ‘$l), a) = 0 
H (evalj-(trm( ‘4l), a) = 0 A eval~(trm( ‘+l), a) = 0) 
+-+ (Sat,( ‘4l, u) A Satf( ‘ijl, a)). 
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So, Tarski commutation conditions are satisfied, and in the usual manner we obtain the 
following lemma. 
Lemma 7.2. For every quantifier free formula &.x0,. . .,x,) in the language of T, 
KCI-IRI k SatfV$l, (xo,...,~,,)) c-t &CO,. . .,x,1. 
We also notice the following useful property of the function trm that can be seen 
from our proof of Lemma 7.1: for every open formula #(zo,. . . ,z,) and any terms 
to,. . . , t,, we have 
trW&to,. . ,tn>‘> = Subz,...z,,(td’$‘), ‘to’,. . ., ‘tn’). (19) 
This property is formalizable in EA and yields the following fact: [T, Ci-IR] proves 
that for all formulas $(zo,. . . ,z,) and any terms to,. . , t,, 
Sat,f(rd(tO,. . , t,)‘,x) +b Satf(‘+l, (evalf(‘to’,x), . . . ,evalf(‘tnl,x))). 
This essentially follows from (19) and Corollary 6.10. 
(20) 
Now let VXO . . . Vx,,,-m(x~, . . . ,x,) be the single nonlogical axiom of T (accumulating, 
in particular, all the equality axioms), with M quantifier free. Consider a cut-free deriva- 
tion of a sequent of the form 3x0 . . .3x, a(x0,. . , xm), A, where A is a set of quantifier- 
free formulas. By the subformula property, any formula occurring in this derivation 
either (a) has the form 3xk...3x,,, a(& ,..., tk_l,xk ,..., x,), for some O<k<m and 
terms to,. . . , tk_ 1, or (b) is an open formula. Furthermore, since the rule introducing a 
universal quantifier is never applied, without loss of generality we may assume that the 
derivation contains no free variables apart from those of A (otherwise, substitute 0 for 
any such variable everywhere in the proof). Let us call a cut-free derivation satisfying 
these conditions normal. 
Lemma 7.3. The theory [T, Cl -IR] proves the uniform rejection principle for quanti- 
fier free formulas of T w.r. t. normal provability, that is, the following statement: 
If a sequent of the form r, A, where A consists of open formulas in the language 
of T and r is a set of formulas of type (a) above, has a normal proof, then 
for all n, Satf(rV Al,n). 
Proof. The argument is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1 and, in fact, 
easier, although there are some subtle formal differences. Reasoning inside [T, Cl -IR] 
we fix an arbitrary substitution of numerals E for free variables of A everywhere in the 
given normal derivation and obtain a derivation p of a sequent of the form r(E), A(Z). 
By the normality, any subderivation q of p has a similar form, and its Gijdel number 
is smaller than p. By induction on the height h of q we prove the following statement: 
For all h,q, if q is a subderivation of p of height h and the end sequent of 
(*) q has the form r’, A’, where r’ is of type (a) and A’ is quantifier free, then 
Sat#V A”, ()). 
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Since there are only finitely many subderivations of p, the quantifier over all q in 
this statement is bounded, and p appears as a free variable. So, the whole induction 
is an instance of dc(eva!,) induction schema, which is available in [Z’,Zi-IR] by 
Proposition 6.9. 
As usual, we consider several cases according to the last rule applied in the sub- 
derivation q. The cases of logical axioms and rules of propositional logic are easily 
treated using commutation properties for Satf. The only nontrivial case is that of the 
existential quantifier in front of CI, that is, when the inference has the form 
I-“, ~(t~, . . . , tm_,,tm), A’ 
P’,3x,a(t0 ,..., &_-1,x,), A” 
Then by the induction hypothesis and commutation properties for Satf we know that 
either Sat/(‘a(ta,. . . , &,_I, t,,,)‘, ()) or Satf( ‘V A”, ( )) holds. Suppose 
Sat,fFa(fo,. . . , t,F, ( )), 
then by (20) we obtain Satf( rtll, (evalf(to, ( )), . . . , evalf(t,, ( )))), whence 
Nevalf(t0, ( ) 1,. . . , evalf(t,, ( ) 1) 
by Lemma 7.2. This implies 3~0 . . .3y, cr(yo, . . . , y,,,) and a contradiction in [T, Ci -IR]. 
So, we have demonstrated (*) and, considering the end sequent of the given deriva- 
tion p, may conclude that Satf(rV A(E)‘, ()) holds. By (20) this implies 
Satr(r\l Al, n). 0 
Now we are able to complete the proof of Theorem 2. Since [EA, Ci-IR] contains 
SUPEXP and, therefore, proves the Cut-elimination Theorem for first-order logic, it 
is sufficient to prove the Ci reflection principle for T w.r.t. cut-free provability. We 
reason inside [T, Cl -IR] as follows. 
Suppose 3xa(x,a) is cut-free provable in T, where o(x,a) is quantifier free. Since 
T is a purely universal theory, by (formalized) Herbrand’s Theorem, as in the proof 
of Proposition 4.2, we can find a f-term t(a) and a normal derivation of the sequent 
3x0... 3x, X(X&..., x,), a(t(a),a). By Lemma 7.3 we may conclude that, for all n, 
Satr(ru(t(a), u)l, (n) ). H ence, there exists a m such that Satf( ‘a(x, a)‘, (m, n)), because 
for m one can take the value oft, eval,-(rtl, (n)). Lemma 7.2 then yields 3y a(y,n). 0 
Since uniform fl2 and Ci reflection principles over T are equivalent, we obtain the 
following important corollary. 
Corollary 1.4. For II2 axiomatized theories T containing EA, 
[T,Ci-IR] = [T,n2-IR]. 
This corollary allows to extend to Ci-IR all the facts concerning axiomatizability 
that we have obtained earlier for lI2 induction rule. It should be stressed, however, 
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that these results only apply for li’2 axiomatized theories, rather than for general 17s 
axiomatized, as in the case of ZI2-IR. 
On the other hand, the transparent analysis of p.t.r.fs of theories axiomatized by 
Cl-IR allows us to obtain nontrivial results for &-IR. For example, we have the 
following result of Sieg for free (cf. [ 181 and our discussion at the end of Section 3). 
Corollary 7.5. The p. t.r.fs of the theory [EA, IZ2-IR]k are precisely those of the class 
&3+, of the Grzegorczyk hierarchy. 
Proof. This follows from the well-known fact (cf. e.g. [15]) that classes of the Grzegor- 
czyk hierarchy are obtained from 6 by iterated application of the operator of primitive 
recursion, which corresponds to Ci-IR by Corollary 4.7. 0 
8. Relativization 
Our goal here is to restate Theorem 2 for a language with additional function sym- 
bols. Let rc(x) be a function. Relativized analogues of classes of functions considered 
in the proof of Theorem 2 are defined as follows. 
8” := E(ic), 
C”(K) := C(K u 8”). 
Notice that C’(f) = C(J?, f ), by Proposition 5.1. 
Recall that do(~) denotes the class of bounded formulas in the language of EA (with 
symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions) enriched by a function symbol for IC. C; 
formulas are those of the form 3x1,. . . ,x, A(xl, . . . ,x,, a), where A E do(~). Classes C,K 
and ni are defined in a similar manner. 
Relativized version of Kalmar elementary arithmetic, EA”, is a theory formulated in 
the language with a function symbol for K. In addition to the usual axioms of EA it 
has a schema of induction for do(k) formulas. This formulation of EAK is not purely 
universal because of the presence of bounded quantifiers. We show how to reformulate 
it in a purely universal way. 
First of all, we show that one can naturally do(rc) define the graph of E and prove 
in EAK that this relation defines a total function. For example, one can first define an 
auxiliary function t(x) by 
t(x) := p.zdx Vi<x K(i)<K(z). 
The graph of t is clearly do(~), and since t(x)<x holds provably in EA”, the totality 
of t is easily proved by do(rc) induction. So, we introduce a function symbol for t and 
then define m(x) := K(t(x)). It is easy to see, provably in EAK, that 
m(x) = m>; k(X). 
\ 
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Now we define the graph of E as follows: 
E(X) = ,V :H y E Seq A lb(y) = x + 1 A Vi< x (y)i = rc(i), 
where lb(y) denotes the length of a sequence y. To show that 
Vx3!y E(x) = y (21) 
we notice that 
E(x) = py. y E Seq A lb(y) = x + 1 A Vi 6x It(i) < (y)i. 
So, given an x we can find a sequence y = (m(x), . . . , m(x)) that majorizes K on the 
interval [0,x]. Then we apply Aa least element principle to find the minimal such y. 
This proves (21). 
The following two useful properties of the function Ic are obviously provable in EAK. 
1. Vx (k(x) f Seq A lh(r+)) = x + 1 ), 
2. VX, y (x< y -+ E(X) = Z(y) lx). 
In particular, the second property shows that E is a provably increasing function. By 
Proposition 5.11 we know that for such functions da(E) induction is reducible (over 
EA) to induction for predicates elementary in the graph of II, i.e., for formulas built up 
from E(X) = y and elementary ones using boolean connectives and quantifiers bounded 
by elementary functions. Since the graph of E is do(~), we see that do(K) induction 
schema is available in EAK. 
On the other hand, let EA” be a theory formulated in the language of EA enriched 
by a function symbol for Ic. Axioms of EA” are those of EA plus induction schema for 
open formulas plus formulas 1 and 2 above. We have just seen that it is contained, or 
rather interpreted, in EA”. The opposite containment is also true. 
Proposition 8.1. EA” is equivalent to EA’. 
Proof. First of all, formalizing the proof of Proposition 5.1 we can show that C(E) is 
provably closed under bounded summation. 
Lemma 8.2. For every term g(x,a) in the language of EA’ we can (efSectively) find 
a term G(x,a) such that EA” proves: 
G(O,a) = g(O,a), 
G(x + 1,a) = G(x,a) + g(x + 1,a). 
Notice that any two terms satisfying the above equations are provably equal in 
EA”. We shall denote G(x,a) by xi_ g(i,a). A similar lemma holds for bounded 
multiplication. 
Lemma 8.3. For every do(K) formula &a) there is a term x$(a) such that 
EA” k t’x (d(x) H x@(x) = 0). 
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Proof. Induction on the build up of 4. Boolean connectives are treated as in Lemma 
7.1. Bounded quantifiers are translated using Lemma 8.2 as follows: 
v~‘xyv(X,a) ++ c x&,a) = 0, (22) 
X<Y 
whenever ~4 satisfies the induction hypothesis. We only need to demonstrate equiva- 
lence (22) in EA’ using open induction. 
For the implication (t) we prove 
c X$(X, a) = 0 A U d y-+ Xb(U, a) = 0 (23) 
X<Y 
by an obvious quantifier free induction on y. For the opposite implication (--+) we 
reason as follows. Assume Vx < y 4(x, a). Then prove by quantifier free induction 
on u, and with y a parameter, that 
v’u<y c xC$(x,a) = 0. 
XbU 
Conclude C xQ y X&(X, a) = 0. Notice that the induction here, being applied as a schema, 
does not involve the side formula Vx < y &~,a) (which is not quantifier free). 0 
From Lemma 8.3 it follows that, using open induction only, we can prove all in- 
stances of do(c) induction in EA’. Now we notice that the function JC can be defined 
by a term in EA’: 
K(X) := (7qx))X. 
This means that do(~) induction is reducible to do(E) induction, and we may conclude 
that EA’ is equivalent to EA”, since the two interpretations we constructed are mutually 
inverse. 0 
Proposition 8.4. EA” has a purely universal uxiomutizution (in the language with 
symbols for IT- and for all elementary functions). 
Proof. In the standard axiomatization of EA’ the instances of quantifier free induction 
A(O)AVy<x(A(x)+A(x+ l))+Vy<xA(y) 
are bounded, but not literally quantifier free. We show that in an axiomatization of 
EA’ these formulas can be replaced by quantifier free ones. To this end we have to 
improve a little upon Lemma 8.3. We show that in the proof of Lemma 8.3 only a 
number of purely universal theorems of EA” could be used. 
Indeed, the treatment of boolean connectives in Lemma 7.1 only requires a finite 
number of equivalences, like 
Ix-yl=o++x=y 
or 
x+y=O*(x=OAy=O). 
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To handle the bounded quantifiers we can simply take open formulas (23) as axioms. 
However, the proof of the implication 
vx~yX#(x,a)=O+ c x+&a) = 0, (24) 
X<Y 
poses a problem. 
Let m(y,a) be a function defined by 
m(y,a) := px< y. &&,a> # 0. 
It is well-known that m(y,a) belongs to 8” (cf. [13]), and hence, is definable via 
bounded summation and multiplication. Moreover, in _&I” one can prove natural prop- 
erties of p operator by quantifier free induction, in particular, 
c X&a) # o+X#(m(Y>a)>a) # 0 
XCY 
is provable in EA”. This formula clearly implies (24), and so, we can take it as another 
open axiom. Thus, we see that Lemma 8.3 follows from a number of purely universal 
theorems of EA”. Taking these theorems together with open translations of all instances 
of quantifier free induction yields an open axiomatization of EA”. 0 
Now we can formulate a relativized version of (a particular case of) Theorem 2. 
Theorem 3. Let T be a jnite l7q axiomatized theory. Then 
[EA’ + T, Cf-IR] k RFN,;(T). 
Proof. We check that everything in the proof of Theorem 2 relativizes. (Notice that the 
relativized theorem is formulated in such a way that finite axiomatizability of EA’ is not 
presumed.) We take a purely universal formulation of EA” and introduce a new function 
symbol f for the standard witness of the (single) ni axiom of T. At the cost of 
introducing into the language of T finitely many function symbols for elementary (in E) 
functions and adding finitely many purely universal axioms of EA’, we may assume 
that the graph of f is open and T has a finite purely universal axiomatization in the 
language with f. (This follows by compactness from Lemma 8.3 and Proposition 8.4.) 
Main steps in the proof of Theorem 2 were as follows: (a) defining the evaluation 
function for f-terms using only one primitive recursion over C(f ); (b) proving the 
totality and natural commutation properties for evalf inside [r, Ci -IR]; (c) showing that 
&(evalf) induction schema is available in [T, CI-IR]; and (d) proving uniform reflec- 
tion principle for open formulas of T (in the language with f) by &(eval,-) induction. 
Since Cl’(f) = C(I?, f) and the graph of f is elementary in II, as in Lemma 6.5 we 
-_ 
obtain a natural do(K) definition of the graph of the evaluation function eval;(x) for 
terms in the language of T. (This only amounts to adding the function rT_ to the list 
-_ 
of initial functions.) For this definition one can directly show the totality of evalT(x) 
using one application of Cf-IR,, which can be reduced to an application of CT-IR by 
the same proof as in Proposition 2.3. This shows a relativized version of Lemma 6.6: 
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-_ 
Lemma 8.5. [&I’ + 7’, Cs-IR] t- Vx 1!y eval;(x) = y. 
-_ 
A corollary is that the function symbols for evalfK and evalj can be introduced in 
[EA’ + r, CF-IR]. Lemmas 6.7 and 6.8 then remain essentially unchanged, with the 
understanding that I;- is included in the list of initial functions. Next we obtain a 
relativized version of Proposition 6.9. 
Lemma 8.6. The theory [EA” + T, Cf-IR] contains the induction schema for bounded 
formulas in the language of EA’ enriched by a function symbol for eval;. 
This follows, exactly as in the proof of Proposition 6.9, from the facts that the graph 
-- . 
of f is elementary in E and that eval; is provably increasing. Of course, we rely on 
a relativized version of Proposition 5.11: 
Lemma 8.7. Over EA” + Vx, y (x < y 4 f(x) <f(y)) the induction schemata for 
Ao(lc, f) formulas and Ao(J?, F) formulas are deductively equivalent, where F is the 
formula f(x) = y representing the graph off. 
The proof of this proposition goes as before, using the fact that 2 is provably 
increasing in EA’, and that the induction schema for da(E) formulas is available in 
EA’. (It can also be inferred just as a corollary of Proposition 5.11 for a language 
with the two monotonic function symbols.) 
The rest of the proof needs little checking. The evaluation function gives rise to 
a natural satisfaction predicate in [EA” + T, C;-IR] for quantifier free formulas of r, 
Sat$e,x). Tarski commutation conditions directly follow from the commutation prop- 
erties of evalF(e,x), as before, and we arrive at a relativized version of Lemma 7.3. 
Lemma 8.8. The theory [EA” + T, Cf-IR] proves the untform rejection principle for 
quantijier free formulas of T W.Y. t. (normal) cut-free provability. 
Here we essentially only rely on the fact that T is a finite and purely universal 
theory, Tarski commutation properties for SatT(e,x), and the availability of Ao(evalT) 
induction schema. Theorem 3 follows from this lemma in the usual way. 0 
Remark 8.9. Obviously, the analog of Theorem 3 also holds for extensions of the 
language of arithmetic by more than one additional function symbol I;-. 
9. Z;, induction rule 
In this section we generalize the results of Section 7 to C,-IR for an arbitrary n > 1. 
Our main result is formulated as follows. 
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Theorem 4. Let T be an arithmetical theory containing IC,. Then [T, C,+i-IR] is 
equivalent to T together with RFN z,~+, (To) for all finite D,,+z axiomatized subtheories 
T,, of T. 
Corollary 9.1. For II,,+2 axiomatized theories T containing IC,, 
[T,C,+,-IR] = [T,&+2-IR]. 
The same result holds for C,,+2 u II,,+2 axiomatized extensions of IZ,. 
Proof. If TO is a finite extension of IC, axiomatized by a II,,+2 sentence n and a C,,+.Z 
sentence (r, then 
To + RFNn,,+> (To) = To + RFNrr,>+J (I& + n), 
by formalized deduction theorem, and RFN n,,+2(ICn + n) is provable in [ZC, + Z, 
Z n+l-IR]. So, [T,Z,+i-IR] proves RFN n,,+2(To) for any finite subtheory TO of T, exactly 
as by Theorem 1 [T, U,,+Z-IR] does. 0 
We see that the theorem and its corollary only apply to theories T containing I&, 
rather than to arbitrary extensions of EA. This seems to be a fairly restrictive require- 
ment. Recall, however, that [EA, En+, -IR] contains and is, in fact, equivalent to IC,,. 
It follows that just a single application of Cn+i- IR brings everything into the class 
of theories containing IC,,, where Theorem 4 applies. So, we obtain the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 9.2. For any IIn+ axiomatized extension T of EA, k applications of II,,+2 
induction rule over T are reducible to k + 1 applications of C,+i-IR: 
[r,%+2-W C [T,L+I-IRIR+I. 
I do not know if this result is optimal, that is, if k + 1 applications of Zn+i-IR on 
the right hand side can, in general, be decreased to k applications. However, we have 
the following result. 
Corollary 9.3. Let T be a Z,,+2 axiomatized extension of EA. Then [T, Z,+i-IR] is 
equivalent o T together with RFN z,$+, ( TO) for all finite subtheories TO of T. Hence, 
over such theories, for any k, 
IT> n,,2- IRlk = [T, &+,-IRlk. 
Proof. Let TO be a finite (Cn+z axiomatized) subtheory of T. First of all, we notice 
that 
To + RF%+, (To) = To + RNz,,+, WA 1, 
by formalized deduction theorem. We have already noticed before that [T, &+I -IR] 
proves X,-IA, and by Leivant’s theorem I&, contains RFNz,,+,(EA). (Alternatively, 
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this fact can be seen from our proof of Theorem 4 below.) So, [T,C,+i-IR] proves 
RFNr,,,, (To). The opposite inclusion is proved in the usual way. 
After the first application of C,,+i- IR we obtain a theory which is a Cnfz U Ii’,,+2 ax- 
iomatized extension of IZ,. So, the second claim of the corollary follows by 
Corollary 9.1. 0 
Now we turn to the proof of Theorem 4. For the sake of clarity of presentation we 
first give a proof of this theorem for IZ = 1. 
Let T be a finite extension of ZZi having, apart from the axioms of EA, the only 
Ils axiom 
z:= vu3uvw ~o(U,U,W), 
where rs is bounded. Let 
c)(x):= 3uvu &(u, u,x) 
be an arbitrary & formula, with 40 bounded. We are going to show that 
[7’, C;I-IR] I- Vx (Provr(r&i)l) --+ 4(x)). 
To this end, first we introduce Skolem functions in order to eat up the innermost 
universal quantifiers in r and 4, i.e., new function symbols rc(x) and v(x) together with 
the following axioms: 
v’u Gx [3w -o((u)o, (U)l, w)-+ 3w < v(x) -o((u)o, (uh, w)l, (25) 
vu 6x [3u T#h)((u)o, u, (U)l > + 3u 6 @I +o((~)o~ fJ> (U)l 11. (26) 
Let U be a theory obtained by adding to EAK,’ axioms (25) and (26). Obviously, 
U has a IIF’ axiomatization. 
Lemma 9.4. There is a non-relatiuizing interpretation (.)- of U in IZl such that 
(a) (.)- is identical on formulas in the language of EA; 
(b) If A E CF’ then (A)- is equiualent to a & formula in ICI. 
Proof. Graph of the function v will be defined by a formula v(x) = y naturally ex- 
pressing that y is the least z such that 
v’u dx VW -o((u)o, (U)l, w> +3we -o((u)o, (uh, w)l. 
Notice that this formula is de(Ci). To show that ZZi proves Vx3!y v(x) = y we make 
use of the fact (cf. [4, p. 691) that ICI contains the so-called strong collection schema 
for Cl formulas A: 
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Then, taking lr~((u)~,(u)i,z) for A and subsequently applying the Zi’i least number 
principle to select the (unique) minimal y shows that v is total and functional. The 
graph of rc is defined similarly. 
Now we notice that the functions K and v thus introduced in ICI are monotonic in 
the sense that IC1 proves 
k y (x < y+ v(x) < v(y)>. (27) 
By Proposition 5.11 it follows that the induction schema for &(K, v) formulas is re- 
ducible over EA plus (27) to the induction schema for bounded formulas in the graphs 
of v and K. Since the graphs of v and K are interpreted as &(Ci) formulas, this means 
that Et interprets &(Jc,v) induction. It is easy to check that interpretations of the 
axioms (26) and (25) are provable in Ei. 
Property (a) is part of the definition of the constructed interpretation, and for (b) it 
is sufficient to demonstrate that &(rC, F) formulas are 42 in ZCi under the interpretation 
in question. By Lemma 8.3 every Ao(E, V) formula is equivalent to an open formula in 
EA’,‘. Such formulas are obviously equivalent in EA”,’ to Al formulas in the graphs 
of rC and V. Since the graphs of R and V are do, and by Theorem 2.25 (p. 68) 
of [4] Ao(C, ) formulas are 42 in ICI, so are the interpretations of arbitrary Ao(E, V) 
formulas. Cl 
Remark 9.5. The results referred to in the proof of the above lemma are all obtained 
by purely elementary methods. 
An obvious corollary of Lemma 9.4 is the fact that U is conservative over ICI, 
and this fact can be seen to be provable in EA. (A careful reader may notice that 
below we only need to interpret a finite fragment of U, and for finite theories such a 
formalization is immediate.) 
Now we observe that the function 
v’(u,u) := pzZv((u,u)). -0(&&z) 
is elementary in v, and therefore can be defined by a term in EA”,‘. By axiom (25) 
we may then infer that U proves 
Vzro(u, u,z) * Zo(U,V, V’(U, 0)). (28) 
Let Tf be a theory in the language of U obtained by adding to U the axiom r, that 
is, Tf := U + z. By (28), Tf has a @’ axiomatization. Besides, since T = EA + z 
contains ICI, T+ is a (provably) conservative extension of T. Indeed, for any formula 
A in the language of T, T+ FA implies U I- z +A, whence IZ, k z+A and T t- A, by 
Lemma 9.4. 
Reasoning in a similar way, we obtain a term K’(u,x) of EAc,” such that 
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Since Tf is a provably conservative extension of T, this yields 
EA t Provr+(r3u&,(u, rc’(u,k),i)l) +-+ Provr+(r4(k)1) (29) 
H Provr( r@(i)1). (30) 
Now we are in a position to invoke Theorem 3. Since T+ is a finite and #‘” axiom- 
atized extension of EA”,“, we have 
[T+, cF’-IR] t V’x (Provr+(r3u$s(u, K’(u,X),~)‘)-+ 3u&(u, K’(u,x),x)), 
and then (30) yields 
[T+, Cy-IR] t Vx (Provr( ‘d(i)‘) + 4(x)). 
So, we can find ,$‘” formulas Ii(x), . . . ,Ik(x) such that, for each i, 
T+ Eli(O) A VX (Ii(x) +Ii(X + 1)) (31) 
T++{VxZi(x) 1 i = 1,. . ,k} k VX (Provr(r4(k)1)--+&x)). (32) 
Since (. )-, being a non-relativizing interpretation, distributes over boolean connectives 
and quantifiers, from (31) we obtain C2 formulas Z,-(x), . . . ,Z;(x) such that 
T k Z;(O) A Vx (Z;((x)+Z,-(x + 1)) 
for all i. And (32) implies that 
T + {VxZ;(x)li = l,..., k} t XC (Provr(r$(i)l)- 4(x)), 
so we obtain 
[T, &-IR] F Vx (Provr( ‘&jc)l) -+ 4(x)). 
This completes the proof of the main part of Theorem 4 for n = 1. The other part is 
no different from that of Theorem 2. 
Now we sketch a proof of Theorem 4 for an arbitrary n > 1. We consider the case 
of even n (the case of odd n is only notationally different). Our proof generalizes the 
one given for n = 1 fairly straightforwardly, the only problem is not to get confused 
by various indices of formulas, functions, and variables. 
Let T be an extension of I&,, with the only non-EA Zlzn+2 axiom 
r:= vu()3o(JvUi3u, . . ~V’u,ilV” Z~(U&UO,. . ,u,,u,), 
where rc is bounded, and let 
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be an arbitrary &+t formula, with 4s bounded. As before, we have to show that 
[~,&+I-IRI t- ‘h (Provdr4(~t-)‘)-+ 4(x>). 
Let us denote, for O< kc n, 
72k+l (uo, 00, * . ., t&-k) := ih.$_kb%,_k+, . h,, TO 
72k+2(UO, 00,. . . , vn-k-l) := b&,-k&&k.. . h,, 70 
42k+l(X, 00,. . >h~-k) := b-kvh-k+l . . .h d’0 
452k-t2(X, 00,. . . > &-k-l) := b&,_k!h&,_k . . h,, 40 
Obviously, r2k+l , f&k+1 E .&+I and r2k+2, $2k+2 E n2k+2. Next we introduce new unary 
function symbols VI,. . . , VZ,, and ICI,. . . , ~2~ and the following formulas: 
* 2k+l := VX t/z fX[h,-k 72k((Z)O>. . . , (Z)2(n-k), f&-k) 
+ 3&-k < vZk+I(X) rZk((z)O,. . . > (z)Z(n-k), ‘h-k)] 
$ 2k+2 := VX ~Z/zX[3U,-k1Z2k+,((Z)0,. . . ,@)2(n-k)-1,&-k) 
---f h,-k <V2k+2(X) 7T2k+l((z)0,. . .,@‘)2(n-k)-It&-k)] 
% 2k+l := ~X’xz<X[h-k ~2k((z)O,...,(z>2(n_k),u,_k) 
4 g&-k < x2k+l(X) 62k((Z)O,. . . , @)2(n-k), h-k)] 
% 2ki2 := ~XkZdX[3U,-k~~2k+l((Z)O,...,(Z)2(n-k)-l,Un-k) 
--f ~U,-k~~2k+2~X)1~2k+l~~~~O,...,~~~2(n-k)-l~~n-k~~~ 
Finally, let the theories U,, for m = 1,. . . ,2n, be obtained from EAY’*“‘~~~~~Y~11~Kn8 by adding 
the axioms $t,%r,..., I,$,,, 8, together with the monotonicity axioms for all Skolem 
functions in the language of Urn: 
X<_Y+Vi(X)<Vi(.Y), 1 <i<m, 
X<,V+ Ki(X)<Ki(Y), 1 <i<m. 
Lemma 9.6. There is a non-relativizing interpretation (.)- of U2,, in IC2, such that, 
for each 1 d m < 2n, 
(a) (+)- interprets U, in IC,; 
(b) (.)- is identical on formulas in the language of EA; 
(c) I~AEC~‘,‘I’...,“,,,~;-“’ then (A)- is equivalent o a Cm+1 formula in IC,. 
hoof. Essentially the same proof as for Lemma 9.4. For example, VZk+r(X) is inter- 
preted as the least y such that 
bi’<Xh-k 22k(@)O,. . . > @)2(n-k), h-k) 
--) gun-k G Y rZk((Z)O,. . . , @)2(n-k), on-k)], 
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and similarly for the other functions. Totality of vi and Ki, for i <m, together with the 
axioms $i and Bi then follows from the strong Ci collection schema, which is available 
in IC, for i <m. Verifying the monotonicity axioms is unproblematic. 
The graphs of vi and Ki are interpreted as ds(Ci) formulas. By Proposition 5.11 
dO(Vl, Jcl , . . . , v,,,, K,) induction schema is reducible to the induction schema for formulas 
elementary in the graphs of all functions vi and rci for 1 <i6m, that is, to &(C,) 
induction. The latter is contained in IC,, hence IC, also interprets EA”‘~Ki~‘.‘~“lll,“l~~. 
Graphs of VI, IT-1 , . . . ,V,, Ic, are Ao(C,), and hence A,,,+, in IC,. This means that 
any Ao(Vl,..., Ic,) formula, being U,-equivalent to a Al formula in the graphs of 
_ _ - - 
VI,KI,.. .,vin,&?l, is &+I in ZC,. This implies property (c) of our interpretation, and 
property (b) is obvious. 0 
Lemma 9.1. For all 1 <m <2n, the formulas z, and c$,,, are &-equivalent to open 
formulas, provided U,,, is formulated in the language with function symbols for Cl, 
_ _ 
~I,...,V,,Gl. 
Proof. By induction on m. Let r& denote an open formula equivalent to r2k in U2k. 
We define a function v~k+,(z4~,v~, . . . ,24,-k) as 
fiut’,--k ~~2k+l((~O,~O,...,~,-k)).~~k(~O,~O,...t~,-k,~,-k). 
v;~+~ is elementary in VI, ~1,. . . , v2kfl ; hence it can be represented by a term in U2k+t. 
Besides, since U2kfr contains U2k, we have 
U2k+I k TZk+l * h-kz;k 
H z;k(uO , . . . > un-k, v;k+@O,. . . , h-k)). 
The latter formula is quantifier-free and will be denoted rikfl. Similarly, we define 
4k+2 (uo, vo,. . ., b-k-1) as 
/&-k <VZk+Z((UO,OO,. . .,&t-k-l)). lz;k+,(uO, 00,. . . ,%k-1,&-k). 
Then 
U2k+2 k 72k+2 H v&z-kz;k+, 
*~;kf,(UO~v h-k-l, v;k+2@0,. . . , h-k-1 )), 
as required. The argument for $k is similar. 0 
_ _ 
Corollary 9.8. For each 1 bm <2n, U, has a IZ~~“‘~~~~3”““““Z axiomatization. 
_ _ 
Proof. By induction on m. A II~*n’3...,Y”‘3K112 axiomatization of Urn+, is obtained from 
that of U, by replacing, in the axioms &,,+r and &,+r, the subformulas r, and &, 
respectively, by their open counterparts r; and #,,. 0 
Now we define T+ := Uzn + r (the language of T+ is that of Uzn). Since T con- 
tains IC,, by Lemma 9.6 Tf is a provably conservative extension of T. T+ has a 
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fl: , !?I I . ..> L 60 axiomatization, and 4 is provably equivalent to a C~“l,.--‘v2J8,h-z” for- 
mula within T+ by Lemma 9.7. This allows us to apply Theorem 3 to T+, and 
to carry through the rest of the proof exactly in the way it was done for the case 
n=l. 0 
10. On &I(&,) induction rule 
We first analyze the induction rule for boolean combinations of Ci formulas. 
Proposition 10.1. &J(Zi)-IR 2 Cl-IR. 
Proof. We must show that, for every theory T containing EA, 
[T,%?(Z,)-IR]C[T,Ci-IR]. 
Suppose A(x) is a &Y(Ci) formula such that T proves 
A(0) A Vx (A(x)+A(x + 1)). (33) 
We must show that VxA(x) is contained in [T, Ci-IR]. It is easy to see by induction 
on the complexity of boolean combinations that every B(C,) formula is logically 
equivalent to both a C,,+i and a n,+i formula, that is, is A,+, in EA. In particular, 
A(x) is A2 and (33) is (equivalent to) a 172 formula. Let To be the finite subtheory of 
T axiomatized by (33). By Corollary 7.4 we have [Ts,Ci-IR] E [Ts,nz-IR], and the 
latter theory contains VxxA(x). It follows that VxA(x) is provable in [T, Zi-IR]. 0 
Essentially, the same argument works for !%(C,)-IR, for arbitrary n, only at the 
last step we have to apply Corollary 9.1 or 9.2. In this way we obtain the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 10.2. For n > 1 we huve 
1. a(Z,)-IR$C,-IR, i.e., the two rules me interderivable. Moreover, k nested ap- 
plications of ?@C,)-IR are reducible to k + 1 nested applications of C,-IR 
2. The two rules are, in fact, congruent module ICn-l, that is, over theories as 
strong as ICn_,, k nested applications of S?(C,)-IR are reducible to k nested appli- 
cations of C,-IR 
Open Question: Is a(C,)-IR congruent to C,-IR for n > l? 
11. Conclusion 
In this paper we introduced natural notions of reducibility and congruence of rules in 
formal arithmetic. We classified various forms of induction rules of restricted 
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arithmetical complexity (over EA) modulo congruence relation. It turned out that these 
forms, most commonly, fall into one of the three main (distinct) categories: (a) rules 
congruent to induction axiom schemata; (b) rules congruent to I,, induction rule C,-IR; 
(c) rules congruent to II, induction rule fl,-IR. 
We gave characterizations of z,-IR and H,-IR in terms of iterated reflection princi- 
ples. These characterizations provide natural axiomatizations for closures of arbitrar) 
theories containing EA under these rules. It turns out that the number of iterations of 
reflection principles precisely corresponds to the depth of nestings of applications of 
induction rules. This shows, in particular, that the two ways of axiomatizing theories 
are tightly related. 
Besides, these characterizations yield several important corollaries concerning finite 
(non)axiomatizability of theories axiomatized by induction rules, and give wide suffi- 
cient conditions for the equivalence of (closures of theories by) n,,+i and 2’, induction 
rules. 
Proof-theoretic analysis of provably recursive functions of theories axiomatized by 
rules allows us to sharpen, and give easy new proofs of, several old results. For 
example, we prove Peter’s theorem on reduction of nested recursion to primitive 
recursion and Finite Basis Theorem for Kalmar elementary functions. WC also re- 
produce some results of Parsons [ 1 I] and Sieg [ 17, 181, e.g., we show that Par- 
sons’ result on II2 conservativity of IZi over Ci-IR is interderivable with (a par- 
ticular case of) so-called fine structure theorem on uniform reflection principles of 
U. Schmerl [14]. 
I hope the results of this paper will convince the reader of the fact that rules in 
arithmetic are an interesting independent object of study, and that a detailed analysis 
how particular rules work not only often reveals peculiar effects, but may have useful 
applications in other topics of proof theory. 
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